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Introduction
For decades, the American public has expressed concern with crime in schools and overall
school safety (McEvoy, 1999; Verdugo & Schneider, 1999). In 2018, 35% of parents articulated
fear for their child’s safety at school, an 11% increase from 2017 (Jones, 2018). As a result, the
school security industry has ballooned into an over $2.7 billion market (Woodrow Cox & Rich,
2018). In response to public outcry, schools across the nation have adopted programs and policies to
address violence in schools, much of which is based upon, and exacerbated by, fear and
overreaction (Madfis, 2015; Noguera, 1995). Although many academics, policymakers, and
practitioners agree schools are often the safest place for children (Diliberti et al., 2019), reports
from across the United States of violent incidences in schools are gaining vast media attention, and
anecdotally, parents and school staff believe that school violence is on the rise (Sawchuck, 2021).
Most recently, the Washington Post reported “the pandemic waned, classrooms reopened and gun
violence soared at the nation’s primary and secondary schools,” noting there have been 14 school
shootings from March – June 2021, the most over any three month period since at least 1999
(Woodrow Cox & Rich, 2021). While it is important to consider gun violence in context, it is also
essential to acknowledge parent, student, and staff perspectives that any instance of violence,
especially gun violence, is too much in schools.
Since the start of the 2021-2022 school year, there have been 16 shootings on school
grounds, representing over 82 school shootings since 2018 (Education Week, 2021). In 2021 alone,
Education Week reports there have been 24 shootings on school grounds leaving 6 people dead and
34 wounded (2021). Rates such as these are not new, however, and have been fairly consistent over
the past 50 years. According to the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), which
tracks any incident in the United States in which a gun is brandished, fired, or a bullet hits school
property, there have been 1,721 incidents with 610 fatalities and 1647 injuries from 1970 – July
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2020 (CHDS, 2021). These numbers include 185 ‘active shooter’ instances, which CHDS defines as
incidents when a shooter killed or wounded a victim as part of a continuous episode of violence
(CHDS, 2021). Similar to the CHDS definition, the Washington Post counts any shooting incident
that happens at a school, a definition which results in 284 incidents since 1999 (Woodrow Cox et
al., 2021). Everytown for Gun Safety has also been tracking school shootings and report 82
instances of gunfire on school properties in 2021, killing 21 and injuring 47 (Everytown, 2021).
While these numbers may seem stark, when considering that approximately 48.1 million students
(NCES, 2021) attend public K-12 schools annually across the United States, school shootings and
their subsequent victims make up a very small percentage of overall gun violence and violence at
schools (Flannery et al., 2021). School shootings are not a new phenomenon either, as schools in the
United States have witnessed at least 11 incidences annually since 1970 (CHDS, 2021). What has
changed, however, is the spotlight placed upon instances of gun violence in schools and the
ubiquitous school shooter. A recent study of media coverage of mass shootings and public
engagement found that media coverage lasted on average 31 days, often longer than the average
public engagement (10 days), based on searches for information with the events themselves
(Croitoru et al., 2020). Yet, exhaustive media coverage of school shootings persists and yield
considerably more coverage that other mass shootings (Schildkraut et al., 2018) often leading to
support for retributive, and at times archaic public policies (O’Toole & Fondacaro, 2017).
Targeted Violence in Schools
With expanded media coverage of high-profile active shooter events, school safety and
school shootings have been a growing concern for citizens, policymakers, and law enforcement
officials (McCarthy; 2015; Cornell & Maeng, 2018). Of particular concern are school shootings that
are premeditated, known as targeted violence—a relatively new phenomenon with a recent
application to the school setting. Targeted violence was originally conceptualized in 1995 as “a term
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that refers to situations in which an identifiable (or potentially identifiable) perpetrator poses (or
may pose) a threat of violence to a particular individual or group” that is not a random act of
violence (Fein et al., p. 1). While gun violence in general in uncommon in schools (Kolbe, 2020),
instances are targeted violence are even more rare (Paez et al., 2021). Due to the infrequency of
targeted violence in schools, it is often difficult to apply (and subsequently assess) traditional risk
assessments or school disciplinary practices as prevention strategies (Borum et al.,1999; O’Toole,
1999). Thus, the threat assessment model emerged as a fact-based tool to assess the potential for
and to intervene in instances of targeted violence.
Threat assessment is a systematic process for the evaluation of and intervention with those
who pose a threat of violence and is performed by multidisciplinary teams (O’Toole, 1999; US
Secret Service, 2004; Cornell & Maeng, 2018). Since the early 2000s, law enforcement agencies
have recommended and utilized threat assessment teams as a tool to prevent targeted violence
(Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). Around the same time, the use of threat assessment teams
extended to the K-12 environment as a mechanism to enhance school safety. Spurred by the Sandy
Hook Elementary mass shooting in 2012, state legislatures across the nation began implementing
new school safety protocols. In 2013, the Virginia General Assembly passed legislation mandating
threat assessment teams in each public K-12 school in the Commonwealth, making Virginia the first
state to do so (Cornell et al., 2015). As of September 2019, 19 states and the federal government
have considered threat assessment team legislation, many of which are modeled after the Virginia
legislation (Smith & Cleary, in preparation). Per Virginia code, each threat assessment team is
tasked with “the assessment of and intervention with individuals whose behavior may pose a threat
to the safety of school staff or students” (VA § 22.1-79.4). Additionally, the legislation specifies the
composition of threat assessment teams and mandates teams “shall include persons with expertise in
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counseling, instruction, school administration, and law enforcement” (VA § 22.1-79.4). With
clarification from the Virginia Attorney General, a team in Virginia can serve one or more schools
within a school division (Virginia DCJS, 2017). Even with this specification, there is currently no
enforcement mechanism to ensure the guidelines in the Virginia Code are followed. The crux of
threat assessment is the focus on preventing targeted violence—a known attacker selecting a target
prior to committing a violent incident (US Secret Service, 2004)—through an assessment performed
by multi-disciplinary teams. Together, given the legislative mandate, the individuals on the threat
assessment team work to evaluate and manage threats and concerning behaviors affecting the school
community. Left unchecked, schools may not be implementing threat assessment according to best
practices and therefore hindering the process as a whole.
Current Project
Although the use of threat assessment teams in schools is recommended as a violence
prevention measure, few studies have evaluated threat assessment teams in the K-12 environment
over time and no studies to date have incorporated the views of threat assessment team members.
Because threat assessment is relatively new process, the literature is sparse, with minimal empirical
or theoretical contributions (Mitchell & Palk, 2016), but has grown in recent years. As such, it is
important to explore threat assessment teams in Virginia K-12 public schools holistically and in the
broader context of overall school safety. Often, “school safety” has been conflated with or reduced
to simply mean “school violence.” This project, however, takes a more complete view of school
safety—one that integrates physical security, school climate, and school discipline, to illuminate
findings previously underexplored by studies that by simply consider school safety as a proxy for
school violence. Utilizing a concurrent parallel mixed methods design and a pragmatic lens, this
project explores and addresses the following research questions:
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1) How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 public schools in Virginia? (Quan
+ Qual)
2) How does the use of threat assessment teams correlate with any changes in school safety
outcomes over time? (Quan)
3) How do threat assessment team members perceive the role and efficacy of threat
assessment in promoting school safety? (Qual)
4) How do perceptions of threat assessment and school safety align with any changes in
school safety outcomes? (Quan + Qual)
This particular method was chosen to obtain a more complete view and better understanding of
threat assessment teams in K-12 public schools. Specifically, this method allows for the
simultaneous exploration and strengthening of multiple sources of data in a flexible and holistic
matter (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007) through the merging of a quantitative strand and qualitative
strand (Clark & Ivankova, 2015). This convergent design allows for substantiated findings as the
merging of the concurrent strands provides for the comparison of complementary data from
different sources (Clark & Ivankova, 2015).
Detailed here is an overview of the existing literature, including a brief history on the
evolution of school safety research and threat assessment in schools. Stemming from this overview
is a framework of methods used to best address the research questions outlined above, a robust
review of the results, and a detailed discussion of the findings. Policy implications are discussed,
highlighting how the results of this research may inform school, public, and criminal justice policy.
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Literature Review
This project focuses on the threat assessment process in the K-12 environment in Virginia
and explores the association between threat assessment and school safety. Being a relatively new
process, the literature surrounding threat assessment teams is detailed, yet many gaps exist. The
following review of the literature contextualizes threat assessment as it relates to broader school
safety research, highlights the history of threat assessment, specifically the evolution of the process
as it is applied to the K-12 environment, and summarizes the existing research on K-12 threat
assessment. This review demonstrates the need for threat assessment team research focusing on the
implementation and outcomes of the team.
School Safety
In order to contextualize the implementation of threat assessment teams in the K-12
environment, it is important to understand threat assessment within the broader school safety realm.
Instances of mass shootings and targeted violence 1 at schools represent a shock to the national
conscience (Louvar Reeves & Brock, 2017). However, these incidents are exceedingly rare
(Nekvasil et al., 2015). Although schools are generally safe, in that any student’s likelihood of
violent victimization is very low (Mayer & Furlong, 2010), there is a lack of consensus among
scholars and practitioners regarding what specifically constitutes “school safety.” Most agreement
on the conceptualization of school safety centers on school violence, which came to the forefront of
the policy landscape in the late 1970s and early 1980s with a series of congressional reports
discussing violence in schools (National Institute of Education, 1978; US Department of Education,
1984; Mayer & Furlong, 2010). The reports highlighted a rise in juvenile violent crime in schools

We use the term targeted violence based on its original conceptualization by Fein, Vossekuil, & Hogan (1995): “a
term that refers to situations in which an identifiable (or potentially identifiable) perpetrator poses (or may pose) a threat
of violence to a particular individual or group” (p. 1).
1
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and served as a prelude to the rise of violent crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mayer &
Furlong, 2010). Since this time, “school violence” has been equated with “school safety.” Even
recently, in a joint federal report by the Departments of Education, Justice, Homeland Security, and
Health and Human Services (2018) for the Commission on School Safety, it was clear the report was
not about school safety in the holistic sense, but more “guided by the need to promote state and
local solutions to school violence” (p. 13). Even though schools are still demonstrably safe
(Diliberti et al., 2019; Nekvasil et al., 2017), the report characterizes school violence as a persistent
problem affecting students, parents, and school staff and almost exclusively focuses on methods to
prevent, mitigate, and recover from instances of targeted violence (Federal Commission on School
Safety, 2018).
Playing into this narrative is a populace that perceives schools as unsafe due to highly
publicized media reports and rhetoric surrounding high profile instances of targeted violence in
schools, even though the actual prevalence of homicides in schools is extremely low (Borum et al.,
2010). School violence (and, by proxy, school safety) is often measured through official suspension
rates, arrest rates, or rates of reported victimization at schools; however, there is no nationally
standardized method of collecting and reporting school-based incidences of crime or victimization
(Astor et al., 2010; Mayer & Furlong, 2010). Without a unifying framework, school safety research
is reduced to a piecemeal fashion within disciplinary domains. What has been consistent, however,
is the adoption of policy based on policymakers’ and the public’s perception that a serious school
safety problem exists (Kingdon, 2002).
Changes in public policy have not helped to clarify or narrow down the definition of school
safety either. To combat the rise in youth violence in the 1980s and 1990s, schools began instituting
zero tolerance policies and other “get tough” approaches such as mandatory suspensions and
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expulsions and the use of school resource officers (“APA Zero Tolerance Task Force Report,”
2008; Mears et al., 2019). These strategies, however, were not grounded in evidence before
implementation and now show little to no effectiveness (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008;
Mears et al., 2019). Additionally, educational organizations and authorities have widely criticized
zero tolerance policies and blamed them for the nationwide increase in school suspensions and
expulsions (Cornell et al., 2018; Losen & Martinez, 2013). Suspension practices, such as those
emanating from zero tolerance policies, have exacerbated racial and ethnic disparities in suspension
rates and further question the efficacy of exclusionary practices, as they fail to improve student
behavior or school climate (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Cornell et al., 2018). In recent
decades, schools have begun repealing zero tolerance policies and looking toward safety and
discipline solutions that focus on alternatives to suspension (Mears et al., 2019; Owens et al., 2015).
Trending away from zero tolerance policies, schools have opted for approaches to school
safety that also benefit school climate and discipline. Threat assessment has emerged as a tool to
address acts of targeted violence, while also serving as a benefit to school climate and disciplinary
disparities (Cornell et al., 2018a). As evident in the threat assessment literature, the majority of
findings are descriptive results of surveys or evaluations or originate from the University of
Virginia (UVA), where UVA researchers pioneered threat assessment research in the state of
Virginia. While beneficial, the current literature does not adequately detail the work of threat
assessment teams in schools, nor does it address if or how threat assessment teams are working
towards broader school safety goals. This project addresses this gap through the concurrent analysis
of quantitative and qualitative threat assessment team and school safety data. To properly situate
this study, it is important to first understand the origins of threat assessment teams in K-12 public
schools.
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The Origins of Threat Assessment
In the latter half of the 20th century, sociological, psychological, criminal justice, and policy
practitioners began exploring new and different approaches to crime control and reduction. One
strategic focus was the ability to prevent crime before it occurs by identifying and intervening in the
life of a person before they engage in crime. By looking at characteristics of offenders and criminal
behavior, certain common factors emerged that researchers and public safety professionals have
labeled as ‘risk factors’ that may be associated with criminal offending later in life. This
development sparked the creation of several risk assessments as means to evaluate, intervene, and
redirect offending, while also providing needed services to the individual offender. Historically, risk
assessments were developed to address certain behaviors—violent crime or substance abuse, for
example—and have been expanded to assess other behavioral or criminal justice related issues
(Borum et al., 1999).
Mental health professionals, human resources professionals, courts, and correctional systems
have been using risk-related inventories for quite some time (Borum et al., 1999). As it concerns
violence prevention, conceptually there was a shift away from models in which “dangerousness was
viewed as dispositional (residing within the individual), static (not subject to change) and
dichotomous (either present or not present)” to models that views dangerousness as a risk that is
contextual, dynamic, and continuous (Borum et al., 1999, p. 325). Clinical assessments of
dangerousness, or risk assessments, utilized empirical research on the prevalence of violence in
particular populations, in combination with individual risk factors that were statistically correlated
with the perpetration of violence by an individual (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). These violent
risk assessments gauged the likelihood that an individual would participate in a violent act as
compared to the individual’s specific population (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011). Modern threat
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assessment draws from these risk assessments and pairs the practice with other law enforcement
tools, such as profiling.
In contrast to a historically reactive role, law enforcement professionals too have engaged in
a form of preventative assessment with profiling. The process of profiling is inductive and compares
an individual to a composite of those who have committed a crime or criminal behavior of interest –
serial killers or school shooters, for example (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). This comparison is
based upon historical facts, such as a history of abuse or neglect, and static characteristics, such as
sex, race, or age (Reddy et al., 2001). It should be noted, however, that a threat assessment is neither
a risk assessment nor a profile but does have roots in each tradition. Conceptually, threat assessment
does not rely on descriptive or demographic data, nor on any composite profile of an offender as a
comparator; rather threat assessment focuses on investigating an individual’s behaviors that may
indicate one is on a pathway to violence (Borum et al., 1999). Additionally, threat assessment does
not rely on the presence of a concrete threat, or direct communication to rise to the assessment level,
but instead focuses on people who pose a threat of violence as the threshold for assessment (Fein &
Vossekuil, 1998).
Another unique component of the threat assessment process is the use of a trained, multidisciplinary team. The threat assessment team (TAT) handles the entirety of the deductive process
through a collaboration of members who are composed of varying perspectives related to the
environment in which the team resides. In a school setting, the TAT is recommended to include
members from the fields of administration, law enforcement, and mental health that can offer
expertise and guidance from their respective teams (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). 2

For an example of a current threat assessment team worksheet, see
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/law-enforcement/fillable-threat-assessmentform-2016.pdf.
2
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This project takes an-depth look into the work and views of TATs, on a scale which has
never before been completed. The development of threat assessment offers an insight into the
evolution and melding together of multiple practices in various fields, all seeking to address the
prevention of violence. As such, it is important to understand the perspectives of those practicing
threat assessment, especially in K-12 schools, as they present a unique environment for teams with
members having varying expertise and professional motivations. Equally important is discerning
how threat assessment teams began being incorporated into K-12 schools.
School-Based Threat Assessment
The highly publicized school shootings of the late 1990s brought widespread attention to the
issues of school safety, school violence, and targeted violence. Specifically, the 1999 shooting at
Columbine High School marked a critical turning point for the attention paid to and the exploration
of school safety (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). Moreover, the focus shifted to how to prevent
another tragedy from happening in the future. The events at Columbine prompted many state
governments to create some sort of legislation addressing school safety, many of which included the
assignment of law enforcement officers in schools as school resource officers (Cornell & Maeng,
2018). At the federal level, the US Secret Service, in conjunction with the US Department of
Education, studied the planning, behaviors, and patterns of those who carried out school shootings.
Titled the Safe Schools Initiative, the project used empirical findings to create a federal model of
school threat assessment (US Secret Service, 2004). The recommendations built upon existing risk
assessment frameworks, yet due to the rarity of school shootings, applying traditional risk
assessment models proved difficult in developing a traditional profile of those who committed acts
of targeted violence in schools (Borum et al., 1999; O’Toole, 2000). Instead, the model focused on
the findings that school shootings were typically planned and someone, other than the shooter, knew
about the plan (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). The report also highlighted a pathway of violence
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exhibited by the perpetrator – which provided opportunities for intervention (U.S. Secret Service,
2004). An additional finding from the initiative was the lack of an accurate profile for a ‘school
shooter,’ other than the presence of aberrant behaviors that peaked prior to the instance of violence
(US Secret Service, 2004, Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018).
Conducted at a similar time, the FBI’s comprehensive monograph, The School Shooter,
(O’Toole, 2000), also informs current K-12 threat assessment practices. The report proposed an
ecological systems approach to threat assessment, which investigated the personality, family
dynamics, and school dynamics of the perpetrator in concert with their roles within each of those
layers (O’Toole, 2000). In the report, the FBI summarized several targeted violence studies and
found that traditional risk factors associated with violence or anti-social behaviors were not present
in targeted violence events in schools (O’Toole, 2001). Together, the two reports uncovered
important findings. For example, in 81% of cases at least one person knew the shooter was planning
the incident, and 93% of offenders engaged in pre-offense disturbing behavior that created concern
in others (U.S. Secret Service, 2004). Both statistics reveal powerful tools in identification,
prevention, and intervention of targeted violence events in schools (Meloy et al., 2012). For
example, among targeted violence incidents involving adolescents, warning behaviors in the form
of leakage and directly communicated threats occurred in 58% of the cases studied (Meloy et al.,
2012). Additionally, all subjects attempted to persuade unwitting or knowledgeable associates with
preparations of their violent act (Meloy et al., 2012).
A more recent study of 18 cases of targeted school violence from 1996-2012 by Lenhardt
and colleagues (2018) confirmed previous works by the US Secret Service (2004) and the FBI
(O’Toole, 2000) in that incidences of school violence were typically pre-planned with observable
traits and behaviors in the perpetrators that indicated a violent predisposition. This study reaffirmed
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the findings that targeted violence in schools was the result of multiple, intricate, and intertwined
patterns that served as detonators, combined with long-standing problems, conflicts, disputes, and
failures (Lenhardt et al., 2018).
The 2019 update to the original US Secret Service report provided additional confirmation
to these findings. In Protecting America’s Schools, the US Secret Service (2019) updated their
original analysis by examining acts of targeted violence in schools from 2008-2017. In the 41
incidents, the study confirmed the following: there is no consistent profile of a student attacker, nor
of the type of school being targeted; offenders had multiple motives; most had experienced
psychological or behavioral symptoms prior to the attack; all experienced social stressors in their
personal relationships prior to the attack with almost all experiencing a negative home life; most
had a history of school disciplinary actions; all exhibited concerning behaviors which elicited
concern from others; and most communicated their intent to attack to at least one other person (US
Secret Service, 2019). In addition to confirming previous findings, the 2019 report reiterated
previous recommendations that “rather than focusing on a set of traits or characteristics, a threat
assessment process should focus on gathering relevant information about a student’s behaviors,
situational factors, and circumstances to assess the risk of violence or other harmful outcomes… a
multidisciplinary threat assessment team, in conjunction with the appropriate policies, tools, and
training, is the best practice for preventing future tragedies” (US Secret Service, 2019, p. iv).
Moreover, a recent study of 67 averted school attacks found that students who plotted violent
attacks displayed many of the same warning signs as those who perpetrated violent attacks, and as
such, targeted violence can be preventable (United States Secret Service, 2021). The report also
found that training the school community to recognize and report concerning behavior was critical
to mitigation; that early intervention was imperative to desist an individual from their pathway to
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violence; that students and parents played a key role in recognizing and reporting concerning
behavior; that the school resource officer (SRO) was often seen as the trusted adult in schools to
whom students reported concerning behavior; and that a trained and active threat assessment team
was needed to identify, assess, and intervene (United States Secret Service, 2021).
The important recommendations and findings from the US Secret Service and FBI laid the
groundwork for threat assessment guidelines still incorporated today (Virginia DCJS, 2017) and
newer studies confirm the need for trained threat assessment personnel to evaluate concerning
behavior and reported threats. Following the release of the original reports, several schools and
school divisions around the country began implementing threat assessment teams in schools.
Threat Assessment Implementation in Schools
As government reports and policymakers began to look more closely at threat assessment,
and as more schools adopted the practice, guidelines and threat assessment models began to be
created to inform more schools on how to implement the practice in schools. Current threat
assessment guidelines and model policies note that in contrast to violent risk assessments, threat
assessments are more contextual, focusing on the immediate threat and the target of the threat and
not a longitudinal assessment of the offender (Cornell, 2012; Meloy, Hart, & Hoffman, 2014;
Mitchell & Palk, 2016). In other words, threat assessment is a behavior-based and deductive process
(Fein & Vossekuil, 1998, Meloy et al., 2011) that consists of identifying the person making threat,
gathering information about the person and the threat from multiple sources, evaluating the person,
and developing and implementing a plan to reduce the threat (Deisinger et al., 2008, Modzeleski &
Randazzo, 2018). As practiced in the K-12 environment, student threat assessment is designed to
distinguish minor misbehavior from serious threats of violence (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, &
Beglund, 1999) and is a support-focused approach that succeeds by identifying and addressing the
needs of the person making the threat (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). Threat assessment evaluates
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threats on a case-by-case basis using a systematic approach to classify threats on a continuum of
seriousness (O’Toole, 1999, US Secret Service, 2004).
The threat assessment approach continues to be the recommended standard for assessing
risks of target violence in schools (Nekvasil et al., 2015; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018; US
Department of Homeland Security; 2018, US Secret Service, 2018). In addition to recommendations
from several federal agencies, in 2013 the American Psychological Association named behavioral
threat assessment as an effective violence prevention strategy (Nekvasil & Cornell, 2015). Yet,
despite endorsements from numerous federal agencies and researchers, the adoption of threat
assessment teams in the K-12 environment is minimal but growing. A recent study of school-based
threat assessment requirements among states found that only one state “unambiguously and
explicitly mandates threat assessment procedures and threat assessment teams,” with five states
implying the need for threat assessment teams, and 39 other states displaying threat assessment
resources on state-run websites (Woitaszewski et al., 2018, p. 125). A review of educational budget
proposals found threat assessment resources are often missing from school reform initiatives
(Lenhardt et al., 2018). However, as of the 2017-2018 school year, 43.7% of all public schools
reported having some version of a threat assessment team in their school (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2019). It seems then, nationally, threat assessment teams are being
implemented in a piecemeal fashion, on a school-to-school basis. This figure that may change in the
coming years as more states move to mandate threat assessment teams in all schools (Smith &
Cleary, in preparation). The first state to pass such a mandate was Virginia in 2013. As of
September 2019, 19 states have considered legislation concerning threat assessment in the K-12
environment, with just 7 states codifying the legislative proposals (Smith & Cleary, in preparation).
Perhaps part of the reason for the lack of acceptance or codification of the threat assessment model
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in schools is the absence of research on the implementation, efficacy, or effectiveness of threat
assessment.
K-12 Threat Assessment Research
Indeed, there is a dearth of research on K-12 threat assessment. Researchers from the
University of Virginia have conducted the majority of research into the application of threat
assessment in the K-12 environment (Cornell & Sheras, 2006; Cornell & Allen, 2010; Cornell et al.,
2018; Cornell & Maeng, 2018; Cornell et al., 2015; Nekvasil & Cornell, 2015; Nekvasil, Cornell, &
Huang, 2015). This trend is, in part, due to UVA researchers’ stake in the threat assessment field. In
2001, a group from the University of Virginia created threat assessment guidelines and
subsequently conducted a series of field tests and studies on the application of their model in the K12 environment (Cornell & Sheras, 2006). The group referred to the model as the Comprehensive
Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG), formerly known as the Virginia School Threat
Assessment Guidelines. 3 The UVA model remains the only model with published research, aside
from descriptive reporting by state governments (Cornell et al., 2018), and is the only model to be
recognized as an Evidence-Based Practice from the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs
and Practice (Cornell, 2020).
The first research on CSTAG was a series of field tests, the first of which examined the use
of the guidelines in 35 public schools in Virginia (Cornell et al., 2004). After conducting 188
student threat assessments, researchers noted that no violent threats were carried out and that the
problem-solving approach resulting in a limited number of expulsions (3) and short-term
suspensions (94) (Cornell et al., 2004). Using data from the original field tests, Kaplan and Cornell
(2005) found that students in special education made disproportionately more threats and those

The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services also created threat assessment guidelines, often colloquially
known as the Virginia Model.
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threats were more severe than their peers, but that rates of suspension between the two groups were
similar, indicating that the use of threat assessment did not increase rates for special education
students. A third field test examined threat assessment use in Memphis City Schools (one of the
largest, more disadvantaged school districts in the US), specifically 209 cases in which students
threated serious violence within or to the school (Strong & Cornell, 2008). The analysis found that
all cases processed through the threat assessment team had not resulted in the threat being carried
out and that almost all students were able to return to the school environment (either within their
original schools or at an alternative placement) following suspension with a reduction in
disciplinary referrals for the remainder of the school year (Strong & Cornell, 2008). Additionally, a
recent examination confirmed that threat assessment teams using the CSTAG model were very
(70%) accurate in their classification of threats, adding that more serious threats are 36 times more
likely to be attempted than threats classified at a lower level (Burnette et al., 2017).
In addition to implementation research, several studies have focused on the effect of
CSTAG training on attitudes about and knowledge of threat assessment (Allen et al., 2008; Cornell
et al., 2011; Cornell et al., 2012; Burnette et al., 2018; Stohlman et al., 2020). All studies indicated
that school personnel, regardless of role type (school administrators, counselors, and school
resource officers), displayed an increase in knowledge about threat assessment and the ability to
correctly classify threat assessment cases, while also showing a decrease in support for zero
tolerance policies and in fear of school violence (Stohlman et al., 2020).
Researchers from the University of Virginia have also conducted six controlled studies
comparing CSTAG to a control group of schools. In a retrospective controlled study, 95 schools that
reported using CSTAG were compared to 131 using another model and 54 reported not using threat
assessment at all. Students in the schools using CSTAG reported less instances of bullying, more
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positive perceptions of school staff, and an increased willingness to report threats of violence
(Cornell et al., 2009). Additionally, schools using CSTAG reported fewer long-term suspensions
(Cornell et al., 2009). A subsequent controlled study of 23 schools using CSTAG and 26 schools
using another model found a 50% reduction in long-term suspensions over two years, as compared
to the control group, and a 79% decrease in student reports of bullying (Cornell et al., 2011). A
randomized control study of 40 schools compared 20 schools that received CSTAG training with 20
with no threat assessment training and found that students in CSTAG trained schools were four
times as likely to receive counseling services than the control group, and one-third less likely to
receive a long-term suspension (Cornell et al., 2012). The authors did, however, report many issues
with implementation fidelity of the CSTAG guidelines 4.
A successive CSTAG study compared rates of suspension between schools that used the
CSTAG model and other schools and found the former group to display 15% fewer short term
suspensions and 25% fewer long-term suspensions; however the study also uncovered that Black
students across all schools were twice as likely as White students to be suspended from school,
though schools using the CSTAG model reported lower suspension rates overall which reduced the
disparity for Black students (JustChildren & Cornell, 2013). Another retrospective control study
compared 166 middle schools using the CSTAG model to 47 schools using a different model and
119 schools not using threat assessment at all and found lower rates of long-term suspensions and
general victimization with the CSTAG schools (Nekvasil et al., 2015). A 2019 retrospective control
study confirmed prior findings and elaborated that students processed via a CSTAG threat
assessment were less likely to receive exclusionary discipline as compared to students processed
through another threat assessment model (Maeng et al., 2019). Similar results were found in
Anecdotally, this is a common criticism of this line of research—specifically, that schools do not know which model
they are using and as such the results are not as concrete as the researchers attest.

4
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Colorado schools using their own model, specifically that in threat assessment cases, there were no
discipline disparities by race, ethnicity, or disability status – unlike in regular discipline cases
(Crepeau-Hobson & Leech, 2021). Most recently, a retrospective controlled study found that
students process through a threat assessment experienced a lower graduation rate than their peers,
but the rate was comparable to students within the control group with similar risk factors (Stohlman
et al., 2021).
Ultimately, studies conducted with Virginia schools have demonstrated “substantial
evidence that adoption of a threat assessment approach can change attitudes of school personnel
toward school discipline, lead to different disciplinary responses toward students who made threats
of violence, and have a broader positive effect on school climate and suspension rates (Cornell et
al., 2018, p. 184). It should be noted that there are numerous threat assessment models being used
by schools across the United States, including models created within the school itself.
Unfortunately, there is no existing research on which models are being used by schools outside of
Virginia.
Several qualitative assessments stressed the importance of threat assessment and
underscored the practice as providing a benefit to overall school safety (Watt, 2017; Goodrum, et
al., 2018; Daniels et al.,2010). Respondents in these studies highlighted the importance of building
trust with students while identifying helpers in the schools (Daniels et al., 2010), providing
consistent training and check-ins with threat assessment team members (Goodrum et al., 2018), and
underscored the necessity of training and support for the team in general (Watt, 2017). In interviews
of community college threat assessment team members, Pendleton (2017) found that team members
perceived the team itself as an important safety initiative. Additionally, members reported serving
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on the team to be an opportunity to help students by providing needed resources, especially to
students in need of services (Pendleton, 2017).
More broadly, a recent review of the wider threat assessment literature found that research
on threat assessment is relatively obscure, especially research at the K-12 level (Mitchell & Palk,
2016). As indicated previously, much, if not all, of the quantitative research originated out of the
University of Virginia. In their review of threat assessment literature, Mitchell & Palk (2016) found
that few publications (12%) employed empirical validation, and most did not feature content
pertaining to predictive validity. Many other publications concerning threat assessment have been
simple descriptive reports from state governments – almost exclusively from Virginia. Qualitative
research on threat assessment is also rather sparse. In fact, most qualitative contributions have been
case studies, cross-sectional, event-based assessments, or based entirely on legal depositions
(Goodrum et al., 2017; Hawkins et al., 2004; Pendleton, 2017).
What exists, then, is a body of research that, while important, is lacking in several ways. All
of the existing research is cross-sectional in nature and only provides a snapshot of the current
landscape. Additionally, while existing K-12 threat assessment research in Virginia has uncovered
important findings related to the association of threat assessment and school discipline and school
climate, none have done so in a holistic manner by considering school safety as a whole. Lastly, no
study to date has explored the team component of threat assessment, nor the ways in which the team
functions, a factor that makes school-based threat assessment unique in many ways. As this study
proposes engaging an under-researched population – threat assessment team members - it is
important to provide an overview of team evaluation in the public policy literature and explain how
threat assessment teams will be approached in this study.
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What Makes A Team?
In the public policy arena, teams can be defined as a group of interdependent people geared
toward completing a task (Denhardt et al., 2016) with specific performance goals and mutual
accountability to work (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993). Additionally, teams are often self-managed,
share responsibility for their actions and performance, and have been found to produce better results
over an individual-based operation (Denhardt et al., 2016). In assessing team performance, it is
important to consider the purpose of the team, team membership, roles within the team, and team
agreement. Because of various team dynamics, performance evaluations are not often well suited to
team evaluation (Denhardt et al., 2016). Katzenbach and Smith (1993) found that for teams to be
considered successful, the team required members with technical and functional expertise, problem
solving skills, and decision-making skills.
Expertise is often thought of either as the possession of an abstract representation of
knowledge (Rorty, 1979) or as a product of patterned interactions and practices (Brown & Duguid,
2000). In the former interpretation, a team functions to bring together experts from different
domains for the aggregation of skills and knowledge (Faraj & Sproull, 2000). In the latter
interpretation, the interaction of team members provides the context for which expertise emerges
(Faraj & Sproull, 2000). Both perspectives view the aggregation of individual expertise as an input
to the coordination of the team – the process. As such, it is incumbent upon each member of the
team to recognize and value other team member expertise, have an awareness of expertise, and be
willing to share information, all which increase team performance (Stasser, 1992; Faraj & Sproull,
2000). In general, teams that trained together, in lieu of individual, piecemeal training, were found
to perform more effectively, as the teams trained as a unit were able to respond systematically to
various situations (Faraj & Sproull, 2000). In sum, for teams to be effective, members must know
the various expertise levels of other members of the team, recognize when specific member
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expertise is needed, and follow through on the delivery of member expertise (Faraj & Sproull,
2000). As theorized by Wegner (1998), expertise is maximized through participation in team
activities and through the articulation and adoption of policy. This process can be especially
difficult for teams with members from different agencies or different disciplines (Frost et al., 2005).
Differences in policies, goals, practices, and verbiage can cause members to collide in the team
setting “as boundaries around specialisms are broken down” (Frost et al., 2005, p. 189). This is
particularly salient in multi-disciplinary teams, such as with threat assessment teams, as members
come together from various fields with differing expertise.
Considering Teams in Threat Assessment
After the release of reports by the FBI and Secret Service in the early 2000s, threat
assessments began to be used sporadically by police departments, federal agencies, colleges and
universities, and some K-12 schools as a tool to address targeted violence in schools. In 2013, the
Virginia General Assembly mandated that each public K-12 school maintain a threat assessment
team. Each team is tasked with “the assessment of and intervention with individuals whose behavior
may pose a threat to the safety of school staff or students” (VA § 22.1-79.4). Additionally, Virginia
Code specifies the composition of threat assessment teams and mandates team membership “shall
include persons with expertise in counseling, instruction, school administration, and law
enforcement” (VA § 22.1-79.4). The expertise on a K-12 threat assessment team is based upon its
members’ individual knowledge and relies on the aggregation of that knowledge to successfully
evaluate each case processed through the threat assessment team. While each member brings their
own expertise, new knowledge about threat assessment is created through shared experiences,
practice, a common goal, and through the explication of consolidated knowledge regarding threat
assessment. Teams are tasked with working collaboratively; as such, the success of the team hinges
upon team knowledge, expertise, and practice.
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Per Virginia Code, threat assessment teams are mandated to include team members with
expertise in different disciplines, specifically law enforcement, counseling, instruction, and school
administration (§ 22.1-79.4). The multi-disciplinary nature of team composition could present
conflict within teams as members from the different disciplines have varying job roles and
functions. For example, law enforcement officers serve a very different role in schools (and in their
day-to-day jobs) than school administration. These internal team dynamics are currently unknown
as no prior literature has sought to assess the actions and perceptions of K-12 threat assessment
team members. Understanding internal threat assessment team functioning and processes is
important as results could inform future training and best practices or may uncover prejudicial
practices or discriminatory outcomes.
Summary
As policymakers, law enforcement, and school administrators struggle to understand and
find solutions to instances of targeted violence in schools, threat assessment has emerged as a tool
to recognize, prevent, and intervene with those who pose a risk to school safety. While more
schools are incorporating the threat assessment model and more states are mandating the use of
threat assessment teams in schools (Smith & Cleary, in preparation), significant gaps in the
literature remain. While there is evidence to suggest that threat assessment can alter attitudes
towards school discipline, have a positive effect on school climate and suspension rates, and change
disciplinary responses to those posing threats in schools (Cornel et al., 2018), few studies have
employed empirical validation, and most are simply descriptive studies of threat assessment activity
(Mitchell & Palk, 2016). To date, no published studies have employed a longitudinal approach to
explore implementation or functionality of teams within schools over time nor have any published
studies incorporated the perspectives of team members into understanding the association of threat
assessment teams and school safety as a whole. Additionally, there is a complete lack of attention
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paid to the actual experiences or perceptions of K-12 threat assessment team members or the
functionality of the team itself. To account for these gaps in the literature, this study proposes a
concurrent parallel mixed methods design to provide substantiated findings through the merging of
a quantitative and qualitative strands. This strategy aims to fill the existing void in the literature
through a holistic exploration of multiple sources of data (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007) and allows
for the comparison of complementary data (Clark & Ivankova, 2015).
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Methods
Although the use of threat assessment teams in schools is recommended, and in many states
mandated (Smith & Cleary, in preparation) as a violence prevention measure, few studies have
evaluated threat assessment teams in the K-12 environment over time and no studies to date have
incorporated the views of threat assessment team members. Being a relatively new process, the
literature surrounding threat assessment is detailed, but many theoretical and empirical gaps exist.
To fill this void, what follows outlines a convergent parallel mixed methods design. This method
was chosen to obtain a more complete view and better understanding (Creswell, 2014) of threat
assessment teams in K-12 public schools. More specifically, this method allows for the
simultaneous exploration and strengthening of multiple sources of data in a flexible and holistic
matter (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007).
To produce corroborated conclusions, this analysis relies on the merging of a quantitative
strand and qualitative strand (Clark & Ivankova, 2015). This convergent design allows for
substantiated findings as the merging of the concurrent strands provides for the comparison of
complementary data from different sources (Clark & Ivankova, 2015). In this design, the
quantitative strand and qualitative strand were given equal standing, QUAN + QUAL (Morse,
2016). Both independent data strands were prioritized equally and interpreted together to explore
convergences, divergences, and/or other relationships (Creswell, 2014). Complementary data were
examined simultaneously to provide a holistic and enhanced understanding of the implementation
and outcomes of threat assessment teams in K-12 schools. The triangulation of both quantitative and
qualitative data provided validation to or a productive critique of findings from each data source.
Figure 1 5 demonstrates the concurrent parallel mixed method design used in this study, noting the

5

Design format suggested in Creswell, 2014.
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data collection and analysis strategy for each strand as well as the integration strategies (Fetters et
al., 2013).
Figure 1
Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods Design

What follows is a detailed description of both the quantitative and qualitative data strands, as well
as plans for the integration of the data results. Together, this analysis merged both qualitative and
quantitative data to understand the extent to which each data source enhances and confirms the
findings of the other (Creswell, 2014). This study examines the following research questions:
1) How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 public schools in Virginia? (Quan
+ Qual)
2) How does the use of threat assessment teams correlate with any changes in school safety
outcomes over time? (Quan)
3) How do threat assessment team members perceive the role and efficacy of threat
assessment in promoting school safety? (Qual)

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

27

4) How do perceptions of threat assessment and school safety align with any changes in
school safety outcomes? (Quan + Qual)
Quantitative Strand
The quantitative strand of the convergent parallel mixed methods design relied on a
triangulated database of data from secondary K-12 public schools in the Commonwealth of Virginia
(n = 542), created by me for the purpose of this project. No existing data source was available to
examine school safety as a whole, so I created a new database specifically for this analysis, known
as the Virginia School Safety Database (referred to hereafter as the Database). The Database allows
for the analysis of overall school safety trends, something no prior study has accomplished. The
Database features two separate components, one for middle schools and one for high schools, in
which all data sources were match based on the type of secondary school. The units of analysis are
public middle and high schools in Virginia. The Database comprises several existing data sources:
School Safety Audit Survey. 6 This survey is administered by and housed within the
Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). Every year, school principals in each of
Virginia’s public schools complete the survey. As part of a legislative mandate, all public schools in
Virginia are required to conduct safety audits (VA § 22.1-279.8) to assess safety conditions within a
school. Virginia DCJS is required to develop a list of items to be reviewed and evaluated by schools
and to create a standardized reporting format (Virginia DCJS, 2018). The annual School Safety
Audit Survey has been used to fulfill this legislative mandate since 2005. The data from the survey
are available upon request from DCJS via a data use agreement. The current project utilized
portions of the data on threat assessment teams, school resource officers, school security officers,

6

https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety/school-safety-survey.
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and other school safety measures implemented within the school. These data represent the physical
security and safety measures present within schools.
Secondary School Climate Survey. 7 This annual survey of students and staff in alternating
years (middle & high) is administered by and housed within DCJS. The climate survey is part of the
school safety audit mandate (VA § 22.1-279.8). The data from the survey are available upon request
via a data use agreement. The current project utilized an existing variable, which I used to represent
the overall climate, or perceptions of safety, based on responses to a safety related question within
the survey. These data represent the perception of safety within a school by students.
Discipline, Crime, & Violence (DCV) Report. This annual report of incidences of
discipline, crime, and violence in a school is collected by the Virginia Department of Education.
Completed by the school Principal, DCV Reports fulfill a Virginia Code (§ 22.1-279.3:1)
requirement to report incidences of crime and violence in schools. These data are also used to
complete federal reporting requirements under the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 (GFSA) and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). For this project, data on exclusionary
disciplinary outcomes were used to represent a measure of discipline within schools.
School Descriptive Characteristics. Variables such as enrollment and percent of students
receiving disadvantaged status are collected by the Department of Education and DCJS.
The population for the Database was made up of schools and school divisions (geographic region
controlled by a school board). Any student-level data were aggregated to develop a rate or
percentage at the school level. School-level data were aggregated to develop a rate or percentage at
the division level to permit between- and within-division comparison to see which level may better
predicts the outcome variable (described in more detail below). No sampling strategy was employed
7

https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety/school-safety-survey/secondary-schoolclimate-survey
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because these data represent all secondary schools in Virginia. The Database, and subsequent
analyses, reflects all public middle and high schools in Virginia that were open for all years of the
analysis and reported data for all the aforementioned data sources. The Database represents 269
middle and 273 high schools and 115 divisions from across the Commonwealth (n = 542).
Dependent/Outcome Variables
The primary goal of the quantitative strand was to determine the association between threat
assessment activity and school safety outcomes over time. School safety outcomes serve as outcome
variables and were operationalized as the following:
Physical Security Measures. This outcome variable represents a count of physical security
measures from the annual School Safety Audit Survey. Each item constituted one point and was
summed; lower scores indicate fewer physical security measures, while higher scores indicate
increased physical security measures. The count was sourced by 1) the number of School Resource
Officers, 2) the number of School Security Officers, and 3) Emergency Access by First Responders
in each school. These items were summed based on three questions from the annual school safety
audit: “How many School Resource Officers were employed at your school for the school year?”
(where values are counts from ranging from zero and higher); “How many School Security Officers
were employed at your school for the school year?”; and “For the school year, did area first
responders have emergency access to the building during an emergency?” (yes = 1, no = 0).
Emergency access by first responders is a recognized best practice by several state and federal
agencies (Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2017; Department of Homeland Security, 2019).
School Climate. This outcome variable represents a mean of student scores for each school
based on student responses to the question “I feel safe at this school” in the Secondary School
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Climate Survey. Students responded on a Likert scale of 1 -5 where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 =
strongly agree that they feel safe at school.
Disciplinary Outcomes. The final variable represented a rate of exclusionary practices per
student at the school. Exclusionary practices represented any expulsion, long-term and short-term
suspension, in-school suspension, and special education interim placement. The total number of
exclusionary discipline outcomes as listed in the Discipline, Crime, & Violence Report, per student
was then summed and divided by total enrollment for the school year. A higher rate indicates a
higher proportion of the total population of a school receiving an exclusionary disciplinary action.
Exclusionary outcomes are indicated by the school principal on the Discipline, Crime, & Violence
Report and enrollment numbers were taken from DCJS. Exclusionary discipline is increasingly seen
as harmful to students and school climate (National Educators Association, 2018).
Due to alternating years of data collection for middle and high schools in the Secondary
School Climate Survey, two separate analyses were performed to account for the availability of data
across schools. As this is a repeated measures assessment, data were collected from four points in
time for each dependent variable. The first collection period was associated with the passage of the
threat assessment team mandate represent middle and high schools, respectively (2012-2013; 20132014); the next from 2014-2015; 2015-2016, then from school years 2016-2017; 2017-2018, and the
final from 2018-2019; 2019-2020. The first sets of years represent the school years associated with
middle school data, the second sets represent the school years associated with high school data. 8
These intervals were selected to allow equal distance comparisons in time (Meyers et al., 2016). As
this analysis relies on an unstructured covariance structure that does not assume equal variances

Alternating years were chosen to reflect the alternating nature of the school climate survey, which is distributing to
middle and high schools in alternating years.

8
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(Garson, 2019), equal distance in the time series is not required. However, by choosing equal
distances in the time, it may reduce interoccasion and measurement error (Cook & Ware, 1983).
Independent Variables
Similar to the outcome variables, each predictor variable was measured at four points in
time. The independent variable and multi-level covariates are as follows:
Threat Assessment Activity. This continuous independent variable representing the
number of threat assessments performed each year by a school’s threat assessment team. These data
originate from the annual School Safety Audit Survey and were derived from a survey question
asking a variation of “How many threat assessments were conducted at your school in the previous
school year?” Lower values indicate that teams have performed fewer threat assessments, while
higher numbers indicate that teams have performed more threat assessments.
Outcome variables as covariates. Each dependent variable also served as a covariate when
they were not an outcome variable in the model (Garson, 2019). Additionally, the variables were
aggregated for a division-level variable. More specifically, there is a division-level school climate
score, physical security score, disciplinary outcome score, and threat assessment score which
represents the division average. This inclusion allows for the assessment of influence on the
outcome variable, i.e., whether the school-level or division-level score influences the outcome more
than the other.
Control Variables
Disadvantage Status. As noted in the Discipline, Crime, & Violence reports, students in
schools are given a disadvantage status if the student receives free/reduced meals, TANF, Medicaid,
or experience homelessness. At the school level, the total number of students receiving a
disadvantage status was divided by the total enrollment for the school year, representing a rate of
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disadvantage status at each school. This variable was included to isolate the potential effect of
economic disadvantage on the outcome variables.
Mental Health Professionals. (Middle Schools Only) Due to data availability in the middle
school surveys, middle school analyses also include a measure of mental health professionals at
each school. Mental health professionals are a crucial component of not only school threat
assessment teams, but also contribute to the overall climate of a school by providing student
supports. This is a count variable based on a question from the School Safety Audit, asking
principals “How many mental health professionals are employed at your school?” This variable
was included to isolate the potential effect of having mental health supports in schools on the
outcome variables.
Analysis Plan
This analysis uses multilevel modeling because schools are nested within school divisions.
Multilevel modeling accounts for any clustering effect at the division level, rather than assuming
independence of observations, as in a traditional ordinary least squares regression (Garson, 2019).
Additionally, as this is a longitudinal analysis, or multilevel growth model, repeated measures of the
outcome variable will be treated as a level within the model. More specifically, Level 1 represents
the repeated school safety outcome, Level 2 represents schools, and Level 3 represents school
divisions. Figure 2 9 represents the three-level conceptual model.

9

Adapted from Field, 2013.
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Figure 2
Three Level Model

This model structure was used to answer the following research questions and subsequent
hypotheses.
RQ1. How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 schools in Virginia?
Hypothesis 1: The use of threat assessment has increased over time.
While certain schools in Virginia practiced threat assessment before the 2013 legislative mandate,
the practice was new to the majority of schools. With the mandate for public schools came a
mandate for DCJS to plan and develop threat assessment training for school employees and other
threat assessment team members. However, many schools received threat assessment training prior
to the mandate from the University of Virginia’s threat assessment model (Cornell et al., 2012).
Since the introduction of the mandate, both DCJS and representatives from the University of
Virginia have conducted a significant amount of training around the Commonwealth (DCJS, 2020).
Also, nationally, threat assessment is increasingly popular in schools and threat assessment
legislation has been passed in numerous states (Smith & Cleary, in preparation). Given the increases
in media attention, training, policies, and awareness efforts surrounding threat assessment, it is
reasonable to expect an increase in the recognition and referral of threatening or concerning
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behaviors to the threat assessment team. This descriptive research question will determine whether
threat assessment team activity has increased since the codification of the threat assessment
mandate.
RQ 2. What is the association between the use of threat assessment and changes in school
safety outcomes over time?
Hypothesis 2: Increases in threat assessment activity are associated with increases in
physical security measures within a school.
Hypothesis 3: Increases in threat assessment activity are associated with a higher
percentage of students indicating they feel safe at school.
Hypothesis 4: Increases in threat assessment activity are associated with a decreased
incidence rate of exclusionary discipline outcomes.
These hypotheses are based in part on existing literature, particularly the latter two (Cornell et al.,
2018), and seek to confirm the findings from previous studies. Hypothesis 2 seeks to support the use
of threat assessment as a practice that is complementary to the implementation of physical security
measures.
For each outcome variable, I first generated descriptive statistics and then two multilevel
growth models, also known as a latent trajectory model (Garson, 2019), one for middle schools and
one for high schools 10. Here, I am assuming that the repeated measure (each school safety outcome)
is nested by school, which is then nested within a division. Additionally, I chose this method to
obtain a complete understanding of institutional behaviors at multiple levels, specifically the
contexts in which there is interaction between the levels, as this method allows for the estimation of
effects of between and within school factors on outcomes (George & Thomas, 2000). Analyzing
This is being done to account for data that is collected in alternating years. The outcomes for the two models will be
compared to assess any differences between the two school types,
10
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nested data using only a single-level method can create concerns of aggregation bias and
imprecision, thereby necessitating the use of multi-level modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). For
example, schools within the same division may all have similar policies and practices, which could
impact discipline outcomes. On the other hand, schools within a division may be more autonomous
and therefore have independent discipline outcomes within the same cluster.
Multi-level modeling can account for this potential bias while also allowing for prediction in
the outcome variable by taking into account variances at the school and division level (Cass, 2007).
This approach was chosen because we cannot assume the repeated measures are mutually
independent, nor that schools within a division are independent, as school divisions often differ on
policy guidelines and practices within their divisions.
The analysis began by estimating a null model to determine if random variation was
occurring at each level by identifying the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC). The ICC is
measure from 0 – 1.0, detailing the proportion of total variance that is accounted for by the
clustering at each level. If an ICC is above the recommended threshold of .05, it allows for the
rejection of a standard OLS regression in favor of a multilevel approach (Garson, 2019), and the
analysis can proceed.
Figure 3
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient Formulas
Formula
ICC Level 2

ICC2 =

ICC Level 3

ICC3 =

2
𝜏𝜏00
3
2
𝜏𝜏00 + 𝜏𝜏00 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2
3
𝜏𝜏00
3
2
𝜏𝜏00 + 𝜏𝜏00 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2

Explanation
Proportion of variance
explained at level-2
Proportion of variance
explained at level-3

Next, each outcome variable was assessed using a multilevel longitudinal growth curve, or
latent trajectory model. From the null model, the independent variable and covariates were added to
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the model, with a check of AIC and BIC at each step to assess model fit (Garson, 2019). This
method assessed the independent effect of the independent variable on the outcome variable, but
also on each covariate. AIC and BIC were used together to evaluate the fit of each model, with
model improvement evaluated as a decrease by 5 points or more (Garson, 2019). Taken together,
these information criteria measures balance each other out, as the former may fail to identify the
most parsimonious models while the latter may choose too small of a model (Dziak et al., 2012).
Once the final model for each outcome was determined, a plot of the residuals in each model was
used to confirm the normality within the residuals, thus verifying the models. Results are discussed
in detail in the next section.
Figure 4
Unconditional Univariate Growth Model Formulas
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Reduced
Expression
Covariance
Matrix

𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

Formula – Unconditional Univariate Growth Model1
Ytjj = 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽00𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽10𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽00𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾100 + 𝑢𝑢00𝑗𝑗
𝛽𝛽10𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾100 + 𝑢𝑢10𝑗𝑗
= �𝛾𝛾000 + 𝛾𝛾100 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 �
+ �𝑢𝑢00𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟00𝑗𝑗 + 𝑢𝑢10𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑟𝑟10𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 �
𝜏𝜏
𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽 = � 𝛽𝛽00
�
𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽01 𝜏𝜏𝛽𝛽11
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Qualitative Strand
While the quantitative strand assessed the association between threat assessment and school
safety outcomes, the qualitative strand sought to uncover the experiences and perceptions of threat
assessment team members. This strand provided a deeper, richer understanding of threat assessment
activity in schools by giving voice to a previously unstudied population - threat assessment team
members. Ultimately, this strand uncovered insights into threat assessment and school safety while
addressing the research questions:
RQ1. How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 schools in Virginia?
RQ3. How do threat assessment team members perceive the role and efficacy of threat
assessment in promoting school safety?
Sampling
The population for the qualitative strand was threat assessment team members at public
middle and high schools in Virginia. Samples of team members were stratified (Figure 5) according
to threat assessment activity and professional role type. The first stratum was from the independent
variable of the qualitative strand ‘threat assessment activity.’ Participants were randomly selected
from schools whose teams were determined to have ‘high activity,’ ‘average activity,’ and ‘no
activity’ from a frequency table. From the most recent entry into the School Safety Index, the 2019
School Safety Audit Survey 11, I extracted relevant data from the Index and created a new data set and
removed elementary schools. I tabulated frequencies of the number of threat assessments conducted
during the year. A total of 661 schools—52.19% (n = 345) middle schools and 47.81% (n = 316)
high schools—were used for the final sample. Over 5,700 threat assessments were performed by
middle and high schools in the 2018-2019 school year (M = 8.62, SD = 16.79, 0-150). To stratify

This school year, 2018-2019, was chosen as it was the latest year unaffected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many
schools during the 2019-2020 school year were virtual for much of the school year.
11
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the sample, the median (3) was used to control for outliers. Using quartiles, schools were divided
into the three categories around the median, the middle two quartiles were collapsed to create one
category and the 1st and 4th quartile were used to create two categories. The three categories were ‘no activity’ being those who completed no threat assessment in the prior year (n = 144,
approximately 25% of schools); ‘average activity’ being those who completed between 1 and 8
threat assessments in the prior year (n = 355 or 50% of schools); and ‘high activity’ being those
who completed 9 or more threat assessments in the prior year (n = 159, approximately 25% of
schools). 12
Figure 5
Qualitative Sampling Strategy

At the first level of the stratified purposeful sampling, the heterogeneous groups allowed for
in-depth representation among schools with differing levels of performance (Patton, 1990).
Once the heterogeneous groups were identified, I created the next stratum: homogenous groups.
Because threat assessment best practices advocate for the creation of teams with members from

It is important to note, the threat assessment process, from an administrative perspective may be subjective. Cases
must be referred to the threat assessment team. As such, there may be variation in the threshold of cases which reach
threat assessment teams. Part of this stratification is to uncover the variation and subjectiveness in threat assessment
case assignment.
12
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different specialties within a school, this analysis compared those groups based on their job role
within a school. The homogenous strata grouped participants by job role for the focus groups. The
job roles included law enforcement, counseling 13, and school administration, each reflecting the
subgroup identified in Virginia Code. By using stratified purposive sampling – stratifying by
frequency of threat assessments, then by team member roles – I sought to capture maximum
variation and illustrate characteristics within similarly trained subgroups while facilitating
comparisons across both job roles and threat assessment activity levels where relevant. Using this
stratification technique provided illuminating insights and explored variability among threat
assessment teams (Emmel, 2014). Stratified purposive sampling allowed this analysis to assess
common patterns from the variation in the two strata, which provided value through capturing the
core and shared experiences among threat assessment team members (Patton, 1990). Ultimately,
this sampling technique attempted to address my research questions through analyzing “important
shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of
heterogeneity” (Patton, 1990, p. 235).
To finalize sampling, I sorted each activity stratum (No Activity, Average Activity, and
High Activity) by division code (low to high) and school name (A-Z) and then assigned random
numbers using the rand function in Excel. Values were then used to create a new list, sorted from
low to high, to create a new randomized list of schools. I then identified team members to
correspond to each random list. If the same division appeared in the randomized list, the subsequent
school was removed to generate maximum variation. Potential participants for each stratum (9)
were identified and targeted, in stages, for recruitment via email. Participants were screened by
experience level, with those having fewer than two years of experience on a threat assessment team
For the purposes of this analysis, the counseling role type captured anyone working in a student support role to
include school counselors, school social workers, and school psychologists.
13
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being excluded from study. Recruitment took place over the course of three weeks. Ultimately, over
1,551 emails were sent, and 53 individuals participated for a response rate of 3.5%. Across the nine
focus groups, 38 divisions (out of 132) were represented from across the Commonwealth.
Data Collection
Once the strata were populated with participants, I commenced focus groups scheduling.
Given the current conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, selected participants were invited to an
electronic focus group on a web-based platform (Zoom). Participants were offered compensation for
their time – a $25 e-gift card which was e-mailed to participants after the focus group. As a data
collection method, focus groups were chosen as a technique to allow homogenous groups to share
and compare experiences through group interaction (Morgan & Hoffman, 2018), ultimately
confirming and expanding upon findings from the Quantitative strand. Additionally, research has
shown that focus group participants may be more willing to share sensitive information in the
comfort of the group as opposed to an interview (Coenen et al., 2012; Guest et al., 2015). The use of
focus groups provided insights into each subgroups’ thoughts and illuminated why the members
think what they think (Morgan & Hoffman, 2018). The use of homogenous groups is strategic as a
method to control for potential power dynamics between inter-disciplinary members on threat
assessment teams (Morgan & Hoffman, 2018). For example, members of the team from counseling
backgrounds may be hesitant to disclose subjectively interpreted professional experiences or
sensitive information in the presence of law enforcement or school administration, especially if their
opinions contradict law enforcement, school, or division policy.
The focus groups investigated consensus and diversity among participants and allow for
comparisons between each subgroup (Patton, 1990; Morgan & Hoffman, 2018). To account for
observed interactions within the focus group, I used various data collection techniques. In addition
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to semi-structured questions that prompted answers and discussions within the group (recorded with
participants’ consent via Zoom), the moderator took detailed notes on noticeable participant body
language, tone of voice, gestures, and other related observations that are visible via the web-based
platform. Additionally, the discussion followed a semi-structured interview guide that featured an
hourglass design, funneling open-ended questions to highly targeted questions, and then back to
open-ended questions (Appendix A). I chose this flow to allow participants to inform discussion as
the group progressed through topics. After scheduling, groups featured anywhere from 4-8
participants. There were several no-shows on the day of the focus groups. Ultimately, focus groups
ranged from 2 to 6 participants and ranged from 22 minutes to 93 minutes in duration.
Analysis Plan
A qualitative content analysis framework was used to guide the analysis of the qualitative
strand. As a research method, content analysis “provides a systematic and objective means to make
valid inferences from… data in order to describe and quantify specific phenomena” (DowneWamboldt, 1992, p. 314). The primary data for the qualitative strand was focus group transcripts
and observation field notes that were subjected to a directed, manifest analytic approach,
determining what the participants “actually say… using the words themselves, and describes the
visible and obvious in the text” (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 10). More specifically, this content analysis
focused on countable, descriptive findings. .
Focus group videos and transcriptions were downloaded from VCU Zoom and transferred to
be stored on the secure VCU drive, per VCU sensitive data policies. Originals were deleted from
VCU Zoom storage. Transcripts were de-identified and cleaned to prepare for coding. Each
transcript was printed and reviewed in a three-step process: an initial read, a secondary read where
codes were applied, and a final read for broad thematic or stand-out notes. After each session, initial
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debrief notes were recorded by the moderator and provided supplemental details to the
transcription. The notes were added to each group transcription to provide elaboration and context if
needed. The constructed coding frame was created prior to (with a priori codes) and supplemented
(with posterior codes) during analysis. This iterative process allowed for a deeper assessment of the
legislation by updating the original coding criteria when significant patterns emerged. During the
secondary read, posterior codes (described below) were identified if needed. Coding notes were
then compiled and grouped based on role type and threat activity level, and subsequently analyzed.
As threat assessment is a relatively new application to the school environment, especially
considering the multi-disciplinary nature of the teams that perform threat assessments, it was
beneficial to apply both a top-down, deductive process, as well as a bottom-up, inductive process,
which is common in a directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Mirroring a method
described by Swain (2018), this analysis applied a set of a priori codes, derived from the threat
assessment literature, and then applied a series of posterior codes, derived from the data. Another
reason for the hybrid approach is the scarcity of research, especially qualitative research, as it
concerns threat assessment. The newness of the application of threat assessment to school safety
offers a unique opportunity to inform codes through established practice. As such, the hybrid
approach offers the ability for the researcher and codes to be flexible, but also systematic – with a
demarcated trail of evidence to denote the credibility of the process (Swain, 2018).
For the deductive portion, a constructed codebook was developed with codes generating
from the threat assessment literature. For example, from threat assessment literature, a priori codes
may include items such as threat protocol, discipline outcomes, team dynamics, etc. Posteriori
codes were primarily informed by the data – focus group transcripts, but also my own experience as
a practitioner. The final codebook, detailing the final a prior and posterior codes appears in Table 1.
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A priori and posterior codes were used as supplements to one another and are considered in tandem
for final interpretation.
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Table 1
Final Focus Group Coding Scheme
Section

Definitional

Category

A Priori Codes

Physical Security
Defining School Safety
School Climate
Other
External Threats
Defining Threats to School
Internal Threats
Safety
Other
Team
Identification
Evaluation/Investigation
Defining Threat Assessment
Classification
Action Plan
Follow-Up
Threat

Posterior Codes
Combination
External-to-internal

Team Formation

Threat Assessment
Operations

Team Training

Perceptions of the Threat
Assessment Process
Team Dynamics
The Threat
Assessment Team

Positive
Negative
Other
Positive
Negative
Other

Mixed

Mixed

Power Differentials
Recommendations for
Change

Threat Assessment
Efficacy

Ideal
Consistent
Needs Improvement
None

Positive
Negative
Other

Resources
Training
Process
Follow-up
Mixed
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The coding process was completed through memoing – keeping notes on patterns and
connections as the sample is read (Benaquisto, 2008). Responses were coded and code counts were
tracked. A priori codes were verified, and new posterior codes were identified through saturation
and checking. Specifically, responses were tracked to identify all potential patterns and the most
salient were used to develop posterior coding, along with my expertise as a former practitioner in
the field. Final codes were then checked with my dissertation advisor. Additionally, significant
quotations were extracted from the transitions, particularly ones that were illustrative of a code or
demonstrative descriptive prowess of a certain topic. Quotations that stood outside of the norm or
were particularly striking to me were also selected for inclusion in the results section. Quotations
are integrated into the results to demonstrate, explain, and add weight to certain codes.
Data Integration
Upon the completion of the analysis in the quantitative and qualitative strands, the two data
strands were merged for comparison and analysis. The data was integrated using methods
recommended by Fetters, Curry, & Creswell (2013) - specifically integration through narrative and
a fit of integration analysis. These two strategies assist in merging the strands to address the
following research questions:
RQ1. How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 schools in Virginia?
RQ4. How do perceptions of threat assessment and school safety align with any changes in
school safety outcomes?
Using the integration through narrative method, the two data strands were merged using a
weaving approach. In this approach, both the quantitative and qualitative findings are written
together on a theme-by-theme basis (Fetters et al., 2013). The themes include threat assessment
team activity, school safety outcomes, and threat assessment teams and school safety. For ease of
understanding, the data are presented in a joint display to showcase topical findings from the two

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

46

strands (Creswell, 2014). This method served as a mechanism to check validity and legitimation of
the findings from each strand based on the themes, ultimately providing a holistic and synthesized
corroboration of evidence from the two data strands (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2015).
In addition to integration through narrative, the merging of data strands also includes a fit of
integration, or coherence, analysis. Here, results from the two strands were compared for the
following fits:
-

Confirmation - findings from the two strands confirm one another, which produces
similar conclusions and enhanced credibility.

-

Expansion - findings from the two strands diverge from one another and expand insights
through addressing the differing and complementary aspects.

-

Discordance - findings from the two strands are inconsistent, contradictory, or in
complete disagreement. (Fetters et al., 2013).

Findings from the coherence, or fit of integration, analysis were then contextualized to the
overarching research questions, assessing the growth in threat assessment activity and the
relationship between threat assessment and school safety. To reconcile any contradictory findings, I
sought insight from committee members as a means to bolster validity and check for reliability.
This analysis used a convergent parallel mixed methods design to obtain a more complete
view and better understanding (Creswell, 2014) of threat assessment teams in K-12 public schools.
To produce corroborated conclusions, this analysis relied on the merging of a quantitative strand
and qualitative strand (Clark & Ivankova, 2015). In the next section, results from both strands are
presented and discussed in the final section.
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Results
As this analysis utilized a convergent, parallel mixed method design, results are presented by
strand. What follows is a detailed accounting of both the quantitative and qualitative results,
following by a presentation of the results integration. Together, this analysis merged both
qualitative and quantitative data to understand the extent to which each data source enhances and
confirms the findings of the other (Creswell, 2014). Results represented in this section answer the
following research questions:
1) How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 public schools in Virginia? (Quan
+ Qual)
2) How does the use of threat assessment teams correlate with any changes in school safety
outcomes over time? (Quan)
3) How do threat assessment team members perceive the role and efficacy of threat
assessment in promoting school safety? (Qual)
4) How do perceptions of threat assessment and school safety align with any changes in
school safety outcomes? (Quan + Qual)
Quantitative Strand
To account for the variations in data availability across middle and high schools, results are
presented separately for middle and high schools. More specifically, the results across the two
secondary school levels include a summary of descriptive statistics and an explanation of each
multilevel model used to address each research question. A summary table (Table 2) is presented
below; findings are discussed in more detail in each respective section.
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Table 2
Summary of Research Hypotheses and Findings
RQ1. How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 schools in Virginia?
Hypothesis 1: The use of threat assessment has increased over time.
Middle Schools

Supported

High Schools

Supported

RQ 2. What is the association between the use of threat assessment and changes in school
safety outcomes over time?
Hypothesis 2: Increases in threat assessment activity will be associated with increases
in physical security measures within a school.
Middle Schools

Supported

High Schools

Supported

Hypothesis 3: Increases in threat assessment activity will be associated with a higher
percentage of students indicating they feel safe at school.
Middle Schools

Not Supported

High Schools

Not Supported

Hypothesis 4: Increases in threat assessment activity will be associated with a
decreased incidence rate of exclusionary discipline outcomes.
Middle Schools

Not Supported

High Schools

Not Supported

Middle School Analysis
Upon merging and matching data across all three data sources to create the Database, data
for middle schools were cleaned. Specifically, schools were checked to ensure data was consistent
and present across all time periods and that data entries were consistent in format and measures.
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Any school with data not present for all years was removed from the analysis 14. What follows is a
summary of descriptive statistics for middle schools and a model summary by research question.
Descriptive Statistics
For the final analysis, there were 97 school divisions with an average of 11 schools nested
within each division (ranging from 4 - 80), for a total of 269 schools. Schools had an average
enrollment of 799 students, a slightly skewed figure with a great deal of variation (median = 765,
SD = 344.59) ranging from 124 – 1,806 students per school. On average, in middle schools, 44% of
students were labeled as disadvantaged (SD = 21%), ranging from 1.5% of students being identified
as disadvantaged to 100%, or the entire school receiving the designation. A full list of descriptive
statistics across years is available in Table 3.
Table 3
Middle School Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Division
School
Enrollment
Student Disadvantage
School Level
Threat Assessments
2013
2015
2017
2019
Physical Security Measures
2013
2015
2017
2019

N
97
269

Median

M

SD

Range

765
.46

798.69
.44

344.59
.21

124-1806
.015-1.00

2
2
4
6

4.10
5.11
8.69
14.16

6.59
6.59
13.59
13.59

0-55
0-78
0-78
0-77

1
2
1
1

1.17
1.91
1.31
1.75

.96
.91
.800
1.23

0-6
0-4
0-3
0-7

Total Disciplinary Actions
Several schools in the data set were new or shut down/merged with other schools during the span of the 8-year data
collection period. It is also possible that some schools refused to provide data to the Department of Education.
14
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2013
2015
2017
2019
Rate of Disciplinary Actions
2013
2015
2017
2019
Mental Health Personnel
2013
2015
2017
2019
School Climate

2013
2015
2017
2019

Division Level
Threat Assessments
2013
2015
2017
2019
Physical Security Measures
2013
2015
2017
2019
Rate of Disciplinary Actions
2013
2015
2017
2019
Mental Health Personnel
2013
2015
2017
2019
School Climate

2013
2015

50
82
70
50
63

105.80
90.50
75.69
84.11

82.84
77.99
70.51
72.45

1-476
1-478
0-361
0-418

.12
.10
.08
.09

.15
.13
.10
.11

.11
.11
.09
.098

.004-.756
.002-.828
0-.58
0-.701

1
2
4
4

2.03
2.16
4.27
4.63

2.25
2.20
2.66
6.95

0-8
0-9
0-13
0-11

4
4.16
4.11
4

3.9
4.04
3.99
3.9

.52
.53
.55
.55

1.69-4.95
1.33-5.0
1.92-4.88
1.56-4.85

3.75
3.45
5
9

7.07
5.11
8.69
14.33

18.10
6.23
9.99
18.316

0-141
0-26.75
0-55
0-134

1
2
1.36
1.5

1.17
1.91
1.31
1.75

.54
.55
.50
.94

0-4
0-4
0-3
0-6

.14
.10
.09
.09

.15
.13
.11
.11

.10
.10
.09
.08

.004-.749
.002-.778
0-.648
0-.416

2
2.27
4
4

2.04
2.17
4.68
4.63

1.36
1.33
2.92
3.08

0-8
0-7
0-15
0-22.5

4
4.1

3.9
4.05

.39
.35

2.5-4.67
2.91-5
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2019

51
4.1
4.0

4.0
3.91

.35
.38

2-4.73
2-4.85

Research Question 1: Threat Assessment in K-12 Public Schools. Research question 1
explored the use of threat assessment teams in K-12 schools in Virginia. Given the threat
assessment mandate, increased trainings, and overall support and attention paid to threat assessment
as a mechanism to enhance school safety, I expected the number of threat assessments to increase
over time. Table 3 supports Hypothesis 1 and shows that threat assessments have increased over the
study period. For example, in 2013, the first year of observations, we see that on average schools
conducted 4.1 threat assessments per year (median = 2; SD = 6.59) with a large range of 0 - 55. By
2019, middle schools on average were conducting 14.16 threat assessments per year (median = 6;
SD = 13.59) with an even larger range of 0-77. Similar patterns occurred at the division level; in
2013. divisions reported an average of 7 threat assessments across middle schools (median = 3.75,
SD = 18.1) with a range of 0 - 141 per division. By 2019 school divisions reported an average of
14.33 threat assessments per year (median = 9; SD = 18.32) with a range of 0 - 134.
To explore the connection and to examine threat assessment activity over time, I ran a multilevel model to assess the association between time and threat assessment activity. As time is a
repeated measure, and middle schools are nested within their division, I first investigated the
clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model was appropriate, by analyzing the
Intraclass Correlation (ICC). This model maintained an ICC of .102 at the division level, and .103 at
the school-within-division level. In other words, 10.2% of the variation in threat assessment activity
occurred at the division level, while 10.3% of the variation occurred within the division, between
schools. Ultimately, the ICC demonstrates that 80% of the variation is within schools at the repeated
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year level. At each level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson, 2019), which
enabled me to reject the use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel approach.
Figure 6

Due to the heavy skew of threat assessments across each year (see Figure 6), I employed a
Poisson model using incident rate ratios (IRR) for enhanced interpretability (Meyers et al., 2016).
The model takes into account the 1,076 observations across four years of data and 269 schools
nested within 97 divisions. The model is statistically significant, Wald chi-square = 965.17 (df = 1;
p < .001). Starting with the year 2013, or the model constant, there is an average of 2.37 threat
assessments per year for schools with a significant increase of 1.35 threat assessments per year,
supporting Hypothesis 1. A visual representation of the linear growth can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7

Research Question 2: Hypothesis 2 - Physical Security Measures. Research question 2
explores the association between threat assessment and various school safety outcomes over time.
The first outcome I examined was a measure of methods to enhance physical security in schools:
specifically, the presence of school security and school resource officers and access to the school by
first responders. Physical security measures are represented by a count of these three items by
school. In middle schools across the Commonwealth, this was a fairly consistent measure
throughout the years. Physical security measures peaked in 2015 with an average of 1.91 measures
(SD = .91; Range = 0 - 4). Reports were similar in 2019 with an average of 1.75 measures but larger
variation (SD = 1.23; Range = 0-7). Results were almost identical when averaged at the division
level (See Table 3).
Hypothesis 2 proposed an association between threat assessment activity and physical
security measures across time. To explore this connection, I ran a multi-level model. I first
confirmed the clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model was appropriate, by
analyzing the Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The model displayed an ICC of .119 at the division level
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and .187 at the school-within-division level. In other words, 12% of the variation in threat
assessment activity occurred at the division level, while 19% of the variation lies within the division
but between schools. Ultimately, the ICC demonstrates that 69% of the variation is within schools at
the repeated year level. At each level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson, 2019),
which enabled me to reject the use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel approach.
The null model takes into account the 1,073 observations across four years of data and 269
schools nested within 97 divisions. The model is statistically significant, Wald chi-square = 21.78
(df =1; p <.001). Starting with the year 2013, or the model constant, there is an average of 1.25
physical security measures in schools with a significant increase of .116 measures per year. To
evaluate model fit, AIC and BIC were examined together. For this null model, the AIC was 2997.47
and the BIC was 3022.36. I then added variables in by steps, checking the AIC and BIC for model
fit at each stage. The final model included measures for disadvantaged students, enrollment size,
threat assessment activity, discipline outcomes, school climate, and mental health professionals.
Prior to confirming the final model, I added in random slopes at each level – independently and
jointly, which allows the slopes at each level to vary randomly but in accordance with the associated
level. Neither attempt, however, improved the model. The final model was the best improvement as
compared to the null, with AIC and BIC scores of 2767.61 and 2821.59, respectively. A visual
check of residuals (See Figure 8) confirms the normality of residuals which indicate the model does
support the findings.
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Figure 8
Middle School: Physical Security Measure Model Residuals

As seen in Table 4, several factors are significant. Holding other variables constant, we can
expect to see increases in physical security measures by year, by enrollment, with each additional
mental health personnel, with each additional threat assessment, and with increases in the rate of
exclusionary discipline (all significant at p < .001). Physical security measures can be expected to
increase by a factor of .08 each year – a small but significant increase on a baseline of 1.25
measures in 2013. Additionally, physical security measures are also expected to increase by .012
with every additional threat assessment performed by a school, offering modest support of
Hypothesis 2. The largest association with physical security measures came by way of rates of
student discipline, as each increase in measures was associated with a 1.58 increase in exclusionary
discipline rates. This could be explained by the correlation between the presence of school resource
officers (which was one of the physical security measures) and higher rates of exclusionary
discipline (Lawson et al., 2019).
Research Question 2: Hypothesis 3 – School Climate. The second outcome I examined as
a part Research Question 2 assessed was school climate - a measure of students’ reported feelings
on their safety at their respective schools. School climate is computed as an average of student
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responses to a survey question by school. In middle schools across the Commonwealth, school
climate was almost identical throughout the years, with a consistent rating of 4 (on a scale of 1-5),
with a standard deviation of .5. Results were similarly distributed across years when averaged at the
division level (See Table 3).
Hypothesis 3 proposed an association between threat assessment activity and school climate
across time. Additionally, I sought to replicate findings of an association between school climate
and threat assessment reported by Cornell and colleagues (2017). To explore this connection, I ran a
multi-level model. I first confirmed the clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model
was appropriate, by analyzing the Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The model maintained an ICC of .18
at the Division level and a .51 at the school-within-division level. In other words, 18% of the
variation occurs at the division level, while 51% of the variation lies within the division but between
schools – a very large amount of the variation. At each level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05,
or 5% (Garson, 2019), which enabled me to reject the use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a
multilevel approach.
The null model takes into account 1,001 observations across four years of data and 269
schools nested within 97 divisions. The model is not statistically significant across time, Wald chisquare = .79 (df = 1; p = .373), which is not surprising as the distribution of climate scores across
the years is almost identical. To evaluate model fit, AIC and BIC were examined together. For this
null model, the AIC was 1287.79 and the BIC was 1312.33. I added variables in by steps, checking
the AIC and BIC for model fit at each stage. The final model included measures for disadvantaged
students, enrollment size, threat assessment activity, discipline outcomes and division level
variables measuring climate, discipline outcomes, and threat assessment. Prior to confirming the
final model, I added in random slopes at each level – independently and jointly, which allows the
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slopes at each level to vary randomly but in accordance with the associated level. The model was
improved by including a random slope at the school level. The final model represented the best fit
in relation to improvement to the null with AIC and BIC scores of 610.11 and 673.90, respectively,
representing a major improvement to the model. A visual check of residuals (See Figure 9) confirms
the normality of residuals which indicate the model does support the findings.
Figure 9
Middle School: School Climate Model Residuals

As seen in Table 4, several factors are significant. Holding other variables constant, school
climate ratings increase as three variables decrease: rates of student disadvantage (-.31), enrollment
size (-.0001), and school discipline (-1.81). Additionally, increases in school climate were
associated with increases in climate at the division level (.95) and increases in exclusionary
discipline (1.56) at the division level (all significant at p < .01). Threat assessment activity did not
significantly relate to school climate, so Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Reductions in the rate of
exclusionary discipline at the school level confirms prior research (Cornell et al., 2017).
Research Question 2: Hypothesis 4 - School Discipline. The final school safety outcome I
examined was school discipline, more specifically exclusionary discipline – a measure of the rate of
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exclusionary discipline instances at a school per student per year. In middle schools across the
Commonwealth, exclusionary discipline practices remained low, on average, and appeared to be
declining slightly. In 2013, the average rate for exclusionary discipline was .15 (median = .12; SD =
.11) with what appears to be several high outliers as the rate ranged from .004-.756, even with a
relatively modest standard deviation. By 2017, the average rate for exclusionary discipline had
dropped to .10 (median = .08; SD = .09) with a range of 0-.58. There was a slight uptick by 2019
with an average of .11 (median = .09; SD = .098) and a range of 0-.701. It is unknown whether the
schools reporting zero instances of exclusionary discipline were implementing a policy to end the
practice, were experiencing a problem with reporting, or actually engaged in zero exclusionary
discipline practices that year. Results were similarly distributed across years when averaged at the
division level (See Table 3).
Hypothesis 4 proposed a negative association between threat assessment activity and school
discipline across time, particularly that increases in number of threat assessments performed by a
school would be associated with decreases exclusionary discipline. Additionally, I sought to
replicate findings of an association between school discipline and threat assessment as reported by
Cornell and colleagues (2018). To explore this connection, I again ran a multi-level model. I first
confirmed the clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model was appropriate, by
analyzing the Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The model displayed an ICC of .42 at the Division level
and .84 at the school-within-division level. In other words, 42% of the variation occurs at the
division level, while 84% of the variation lies within the division but between schools – a very large
amount of the variation. At each level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson,
2019), which enabled me to reject the use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel
approach.
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The null model takes into account the 1,070 observations across four years of data and 269
schools nested within 97 divisions. The model is statistically significant across time, Wald chisquare = .115.92 (df =1; p <.001). Starting with the year 2013, or the model constant, there is an
average disciplinary rate of .15 in schools with a significant decrease of -.012 to the rate per year.
To evaluate model fit, AIC and BIC were examined together. For this null model, the AIC was 2985.96 and the BIC was -2961.08. It is important to note here that AIC and BIC are not absolute
values, as such the smallest number still represents the best model fit (Garson, 2019). I added
variables in by steps, checking the AIC and BIC for model fit at each stage. The final model
included measures for disadvantaged students, enrollment size, mental health professionals, threat
assessment activity, physical security measures, climate, and division level variable for discipline.
Prior to confirming the final model, I added in random slopes at each level – independently and
jointly, which allows the slopes at each level to vary randomly but in accordance with the associated
level. Neither attempt, however, improved the model. The final model was improved with AIC and
BIC scores of -3417.26 and -.3385.38, respectively, representing a major improvement to our
model. A visual check of residuals (See Figure 10) confirms the normality of residuals which
indicate the model does support the findings.
Figure 10
Middle School: School Discipline Model Residuals

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

60

As seen in Table 4, several factors are significant. Given the other variables are held
constant, we can expect to see an increase in exclusionary discipline rates associated with decreases
in rates of school climate (-.024), which confirms prior research (Cornell et al., 2018). Additionally,
increases in rates of discipline were associated with increases in rates of disadvantaged students
(.084). The largest association with school discipline rates came by way of rates of discipline at the
division level, as each increase at the school level was associated with a .736 increase across the
division. This finding is consistent when considering the high ICC of .84 at the within group
measure in the null model. There was not a significant association between a school’s discipline rate
and threat assessments – failing to support Hypothesis 4.
Table 4
Middle School Multilevel Models
Threat Assessment Activity
ICC
Division
School|Division

.102
.103

year
Assessments

Coef
1.34
2.36

Physical Security Measures
ICC
Division
School|Division

.119
.187

null

null

year
Measures

Coef
.116
1.25

Z
31.07
7.58

p<|z|
0.000
0.000

95% Conf. Interval
1.32
1.37
1.89
2.96

Z
4.67
19.42

p<|z|
0.00
0.00

95% Conf. Interval
.067
.165
1.13
1.98

AIC
2997.47
Final Model

year
Enrollment
Mental Health
Disadvantage

Coef
.083
.00075
.0204
.266

Z
2.98
2.38
.007
1.33

BIC
3022.36
p<|z|
0.003**
0.000**
0.006**
.183

95% Conf. Interval
.0284
.138
.0005
.001
.0059
.035
-.126
.657
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61
.0119
1.558
.0632
.0636

4.16
3.57
.89
.17

0.00**
0.000**
0.371
.864

AIC
2767.61
School Climate
ICC
null

Division
School|Division

.18
.51

year
Climate

Coef
-.009
3.95

Z
-.89
100.95

year
Disadvantage
Enrollment
Assessments
Discipline
Div. Climate
Div. Discipline
Div. Assessments
Climate

Coef
.0003
-.311
-.0001
-.0015
-1.81
.95
1.56
.0006
.473

Z
.04
-3.50
-2.56
-1.46
-8.98
25.86
7.12
.71
2.7

p<|z|
0.373
0.00

null

year
Discipline

p<|z|
.966
0.000**
0.01**
.15
0.000**
0.000**
0.000**
0.48
0.007**

year

95% Conf. Interval
-.018
.019
-.486
-.137
-.0002
-.00003
-.004
.0005
-2.20
-1.41
.877
1.02
1.13
1.99
-.001
.002
.13
.816
BIC
673.90

.42
.84
Coef
-.012
.151

Z
-10.77
17.07

p<|z|
0.00
0.00

AIC
-2985.96
Final Model

95% Conf. Interval
-.030
.011
3.88
4.03
BIC
1312.33

AIC
610.11
School Discipline
ICC
Division
School|Division

.018
2.41
.202
.7901

BIC
2821.59

AIC
1287.79
Final Model

.0063
.7017
-.0753
-.663

Coef
-.0021

Z
-2.10

95% Conf. Interval
-.015
-.010
.134
.169
BIC
-2961.08

p<|z|
.036*

95% Conf. Interval
-.0041
-.0001
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Climate
Mental Health Staff
Division Discipline
Discipline

62
.084
-.00002
-.00008
.002
-.024
-.0003
.736
.106

4.49
-1.88
-.72
1.71
-8.17
-1.26
27.77
5.33
AIC
-3417.26

0.000**
0.06
0.47
0.08
0.000**
0.21
0.000**
0.000**

.047
-.0004
-.0003
-.0003
-.0295
-.0009
.6844
.0672

.121
8.51e-07
.0001
.0044
-.0180
.0002
.7883
.1452

BIC
-3358.38

High School Analysis
As with middle schools, after merging and matching data across all three data sources to
create the Database, high school data were subsequently cleaned. Specifically, schools were
checked to ensure data was consistent and present across all time periods and that data entries were
consistent in format and measures. Any school with data not present for all years was removed from
the analysis 15. What follows is a summary of descriptives for high schools and a model breakdown
by research question.
Descriptive Statistics
For the final analysis, there were 115 school divisions with an average of 9.5 schools nested
within (ranging from 4-76), for a total of 273. Compared to middle schools, there are more schools
and more divisions represented in the high school dataset. High schools had a much higher
enrollment average as compared to middle schools, with an average enrollment of 1216.84 students,
relatively normally distributed, with a great deal of variation (median = 1200, SD = 664.28) ranging
from 124-2915 students per school. On average, high schools had a slightly lower percentage of
students that were identified as disadvantaged as compared to middle schools (41% vs 44%), but in
several high schools the entire student population received such a designation (median = .40; mean

Several schools in the data set were new or shut down/merged with other schools during the span of the 8-year data
collection period. It is also possible that some schools refused to provide data to the Department of Education.
15
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= .44; SD = .22; range = .023 -1.0). A full list of descriptive statistics across years is available in
Table 5.
Table 5
High School Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Division
School
Enrollment
Student Disadvantage
School Level
Threat Assessments
2014
2016
2018
2020
Physical Security Measures
2014
2016
2018
2020
Total Disciplinary Actions
2014
2016
2018
2020
Rate of Disciplinary Actions
2014
2016
2018
2020
School Climate
2014
2016
2018
2020
Division Level
Threat Assessments
2014
2016
2018

N
115
273

Median

M

SD

Range

1200
.40

1216.84
.41

664.28
.22

122-2915
.023-1

2
3
6
6

3.93
5.64
10.53
9.72

5.62
7.97
13.68
11.65

0-45
0-58
0-65
0-79

2
2
2
2

1.86
2.34
2.87
2.93

.63
.68
2.29
2.14

0-3
0-4
0-12
0-10

98
67
76
60

119.54
90.87
92.64
73.27

92.54
86.20
79.12
57.79

1-523
372-552
340-553
246-406

.10
.07
.07
.058

.111
.086
.087
.069

.076
.074
.07
.055

.004-.427
.31-.427
.3-.744
.239-.422

4.03
4
3.85
3.88

3.99
3.92
3.78
3.83

.28
.48
.42
.24

3.01-4.64
3.17-4.66
3.12-4.4
3.22-4.44

3
4
8.05

3.93
5.64
11.49

3.53
5.96
12.5

0-19
0-35
0-65
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Physical Security Measures
2014
2016
2018
2020
Rate of Disciplinary Actions
2014
2016
2018
2020
School Climate
2014
2016
2018
2020

64
7.67

12.20

14.47

0-91

2
2.25
2.14
2.33

1.86
2.35
2.87
2.94

.44
.49
1.85
1.74

0-3
1-4
0-9
1-9

.11
.085
.08
.063

.11
.086
.087
.069

.057
.057
.051
.04

.015-.271
.232-.232
.22-.326
.177-.253

4.02
3.98
3.83
3.86

3.99
3.92
3.78
3.84

.22
.24
.32
.22

3.01-4.46
3.00-4.44
3.07-4.28
2.64-4.19

Research Question 1: Threat Assessment in K-12 Public Schools. Research question 1
explored the use of threat assessment teams in K-12 schools in Virginia. As with middle schools,
given the growing attention paid to threat assessment over the years, I expected the number of threat
assessments to increase over time. Similar to middle schools, descriptive statistics (Table 5) support
Hypothesis 1 and shows that threat assessments have increased over the study period. For example,
in 2014, the first year of observations, we see that on average schools conducted 3.93 threat
assessments per year (median = 2; SD = 5.62) with a large range of 0-42. By 2018, the peak, high
schools on average were conducting 10.53 threat assessments per year (median = 6; SD = 13.68)
with an even larger range of 0-65. The year 2020, however, saw a slight dip in average threat
assessments with 9.72 (median = 6; SD = 11.65) but a greater range with 0-79. This dip could be a
result of many schools transitioning to remote education in April of 2020, however, school staff
reported in the qualitative focus groups that they were still performing threat assessments during the
pandemic. Similar patterns occurred at the division level, however, 2020 data remained high with an
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average of 12.20 threat assessments (median = 7.67; SD = 14.47) with a range of 0-134 per division.
Patterns were also similar as compared to middle schools.
To explore the connection, and to examine threat assessment activity over time, I ran a
multi-level model to assess the association between time and threat assessment activity. As time is a
repeated measure, and middle schools are nested within their division, I first investigated the
clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model was appropriate, by analyzing the
Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The null model displayed an ICC of .10 at the Division level and .129
at the school-within-division level. In other words, 10% of the variation occurs at the division level,
while 12.9% of the variation lies within the division but between schools. Ultimately, the ICC
demonstrates that 77% of the variation is within schools at the repeated year level. At each level, the
ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson, 2019), which enabled me to reject the use of a
standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel approach.
Figure 11

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

66

Due to the heavy skew of threat assessments across each year (see Figure 11), I employed a
Poisson model using incident rate ratios (IRR) for enhanced interpretability (Meyers et al., 2016).
The model takes into account the 1,092 observations across four years of data and 273 schools
nested within 115 divisions. The model is statistically significant, Wald chi-square = 883.18 (df =1;
p <.001). Starting with the year 2014, the model constant is much high than for middle schools,
indicating an average of 3.34 threat assessments per year with a significant increase of 1.36 threat
assessments per year, ultimately supporting Hypothesis 1. The rate of change, however, was almost
identical between middle and high schools (1.34 and 1.36, respectively). A visual representation of
the linear growth can be seen in Figure 12.
Figure 12
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Research Question 2: Hypothesis 2 - Physical Security Measures. Research question 2
explores the association between threat assessment and various school safety outcomes overtime.
The first outcome I examined was a measure of methods to enhance physical security in schools,
specifically, the presence of school security and school resource officers and access to the school by
first responders. Physical security measures are represented by a count of three items by school. As
with middle schools, in high school across the Commonwealth this was a fairly consistent measure
throughout the years. However, high schools showed some growth over the years. In 2014, high
schools averaged 1.86 physical security measures (median = 2; SD = .63) with a range from 0-3, by
the peak in 2020 with an average of 2.9 measures (SD = 2.14; Range = 0-10), a higher average then
in middle schools. Physical security measures similarly grew when measured at the division level
(See Table 5).
Hypothesis 2 proposed an association between threat assessment activity and physical
security measures across time. To explore this connection, I ran a multi-level model. I first
confirmed the clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model was appropriate, by
analyzing the Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The null model maintained an ICC of .11 at the Division
level and .11 at the school-within-division level. In other words, 11% of the variation occurs at the
division level, while 11% of the variation lies within the division but between schools. Ultimately,
the ICC demonstrates that 78% of the variation is within schools at the repeated year level. At each
level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson, 2019), which enabled me to reject the
use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel approach.
The null model takes into account the 1,092 observations across four years of data and 273
schools nested within 115 divisions. The model is statistically significant, Wald chi-square = 81.66
(df =1; p <.001). Starting with the year 2014, or the model constant, there is an average of 1.86
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physical security measures in schools with a significant increase of .376 measures per year, both of
which are higher than at the middle school level. To evaluate model fit, AIC and BIC were
examined together. For this null model, the AIC was 4124.91 and the BIC was 4149.89. I added
variables in by steps, checking the AIC and BIC for model fit at each stage. The final model
included measures for disadvantaged students, enrollment size, threat assessment activity, discipline
outcomes, school climate, and division level measures of climate, threat assessment activity,
discipline outcomes, and physical security measures. As compared to the middle school model, the
high school data was much more accepting of variables within the model. Prior to confirming the
final model, I added in random slopes at each level – independently and jointly, which allows the
slopes at each level to vary randomly but in accordance with the associated level. Using random
slopes and both levels improved the model. The final model was improved with AIC and BIC
scores of 2849.84 and 2929.13, respectively. A visual check of residuals (See Figure 13confirms the
normality of residuals which indicate the model does support the findings.
Figure 13
High School: Physical Security Measures Model Residuals
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As seen in Table 6, several factors are significant. Given the other variables are held
constant, there is an association between physical security measures and discipline with every
increase in security measures associated with a 1.367 (p = .04) increase in rate of exclusionary
discipline. Physical security measures are expected to increase by .011 with every additional threat
assessment performed by a school, offering modest support for Hypothesis 2, as it was with middle
schools. Physical security measures are also associated with similar measures at the division level
as each increase in measures was associated with a .995 increase at the Division level, perhaps
demonstrating with influence of division level policy on individual schools. The increase in
discipline outcomes (1.37, p = .04) could be explained by the correlation between the presence of
school resource officers (which was one of the physical security measures) and higher rates of
exclusionary discipline (Lawson et al., 2019).
Research Question 2: Hypothesis 3 – School Climate. The second outcome I examined
was school climate - a measure of students’ reported feelings on their safety at their respective
schools. School climate is computed as an average of student responses by school. Unlike in middle
schools, which reported almost identical averages throughout the years, high school climate
appeared to be declining over the years. At its peak in 2014, students reported an average climate
score of 3.99 out of 5 (median = 4.03; SD = .28) with a range of 3.01-4.64. By 2020, students
reported an average climate score of 3.78 (median = 3.88; SD = .24) with a range of 3.22-4.44.
Scores were similarly distributed across years when averaged at the division level (See Table 5).
Hypothesis 3 proposed an association between threat assessment activity and school climate
across time. Additionally, I sought to replicate findings of an association between school climate
and threat assessment as previously reported by Cornell and colleagues (2017). To explore this
connection, I ran a multi-level model. I first confirmed the clustering effect to determine if using a
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multilevel model was appropriate, by analyzing the Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The null model
maintained an ICC of .07 at the Division level and a .22 at the school-within-division level. In other
words, 7% of the variation occurs at the division level, while 22% of the variation lies within the
division but between schools. At each level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson,
2019), which enabled me to reject the use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel
approach.
The null model takes into account the 1,049 observations across four years of data and 273
schools nested within 115 divisions. The model is statistically significant across time, Wald chisquare = 42.41 (df =1; p <.00), which was different from the middle school data – which was fairly
consistent across years. Starting with the year 2014, or the model constant, there is an average
climate score of 3.95 in schools with a significant decrease of .06 across each year. To evaluate
model fit, AIC and BIC were examined together. For this null model, the AIC was 950.72 and the
BIC was 975.49. I added variables in by steps, checking the AIC and BIC for model fit at each
stage. The final model included measures for disadvantaged students, enrollment size, threat
assessment activity, physical security measures, discipline outcomes and division level variables
measuring climate, discipline outcomes, and threat assessment. Prior to confirming the final model,
I added in random slopes at each level – independently and jointly, which allows the slopes at each
level to vary randomly but in accordance with the associated level. However, the model was not
improved by including a random slope at either level. The final model was greatly improved with
AIC and BIC scores of 401.45 and 465.88, respectively, representing a major improvement to our
model. A visual check of residuals (See Figure 14) confirms the normality of residuals which
indicate the model does support the findings.
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Figure 14
High School: School Climate Model Residuals

As seen in Table 6, several factors are significant. Holding other variables constant, school
climate ratings increase as one variable decreases: rates of school discipline (-1.02). Additionally
increases in school climate were associated with increases in school climate at the division level
(1.0) and increases in exclusionary discipline (1.05) at the division level (all significant at p < .01).
Threat assessment activity did not significantly relate to school climate failing to support
Hypothesis 3. The largest association with school climate came by way of rates of school climate at
the division level, as each increase at the school level was associated with a .95 increase across the
division. This finding is consistent when considering the high ICC of .51 at the within group
measure in the null model. Additionally, reductions in the rate of exclusionary discipline at the
school level confirms prior research (Cornell et al., 2018). An interesting finding, however, was that
when considering exclusionary discipline at the division level, the opposite effect was true
(although not as strong), perhaps indicating that school level discipline is more closely impacted by
school level climate than discipline throughout the entire division.
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Research Question 2: Hypothesis 4 - School Discipline. The final school safety outcome I
examined was school discipline, more specifically exclusionary discipline – a measure of the rate of
exclusionary discipline instances at a school per student per year. As seen in middle schools across
the Commonwealth, exclusionary discipline rates remained low, on average, and appeared to be
declining slightly and were lower than in middle schools. In 2014, the average rate for exclusionary
discipline was .11 (median = .10; SD = .076) with what appears to be several high outliers as the
rate ranged from .004-.472, even with not much variation. By 2020, the average rate was .069
(median = .058; SD = .055) with a range of .239-.422. Results were similarly distributed across
years when averaged at the division level (See Table 5).
Hypothesis 4 proposed a negative association between threat assessment activity and school
discipline across time, particularly that increases in number of threat assessments performed by a
school would be associated with decreases exclusionary discipline. Additionally, I sought to
replicate findings of an association between school discipline and threat assessment as reported by
Cornell and colleagues (2018). To explore this connection, I again ran a multi-level model. I first
confirmed the clustering effect to determine if using a multilevel model was appropriate, by
analyzing the Intraclass Correlation (ICC). The null model displayed an ICC of .20 at the Division
level and .74 at the school-within-division level. In other words, 20% of the variation occurs at the
division level, while 74% of the variation lies within the division but between schools – a very large
amount of the variation. At each level, the ICC exceeded the threshold of .05, or 5% (Garson,
2019), which enabled me to reject the use of a standard OLS approach in favor of a multilevel
approach.
The null model takes into account the 1,092 observations across four years of data and 273
schools nested within 115 divisions. The model is statistically significant across time, Wald chi-
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square = .185.74 (df =1; p <.001). Starting with the year 2013, or the model constant, there is an
average disciplinary rate of .115 in schools with a significant decrease of .013 to the rate per year.
To evaluate model fit, AIC and BIC were examined together. For this null model, the AIC was 3476.28 and the BIC was -.3551.31. It is important to note here that AIC and BIC are not absolute
values, as such the smallest number still represents the best model fit (Garson, 2019). I added
variables in by steps, checking the AIC and BIC for model fit at each stage. The final model
included measures for disadvantaged students, enrollment size, threat assessment activity, physical
security measures, climate, and division level variable for climate and discipline. Prior to
confirming the final model, I added in random slopes at each level – independently and jointly,
which allows the slopes at each level to vary randomly but in accordance with the associated level.
Neither attempt, however, improved the model. The final model was improved with AIC and BIC
scores of -4277.01 and -4207.63, respectively, representing a major improvement to our model. A
visual check of residuals (Figure 15) confirms the normality of residuals which indicate the model
does support the findings.
Figure 15
High School: School Discipline Model Residuals
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As seen in Table 6, several factors are significant. Given the other variables are held
constant, we can expect to see an increase in exclusionary discipline rates associated with increases
in student disadvantage (.062), which confirms prior research (Cornell et al., 2018). The largest
association with school discipline rates came by way of rates of discipline at the division level, as
each increase at the school level was associated with a .981 increase across the division. This
finding is consistent when considering the high ICC of .74 at the within group measure in the null
model. There was a significant association between a school’s discipline rate and threat assessments
– for every additional threat assessment, the school discipline rate could be expected to increase by
.0002, however, this was the opposite of the hypothesized direction and thus fails to support
Hypothesis 4.
Table 6
High School Multilevel Models
Threat Assessment Activity
ICC
Division
School|Division

.10
.129

year
Assessments

Coef
1.36
3.34

Physical Security Measures
ICC
Division
School|Division

.11
.11

null

null

year
Measures

Coef
.116
1.25

Z
29.72
19.76

p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval
0.000
1.33
1.38
0.00
2.96
3.76

Z
4.67
19.42

p<|z|
0.00
0.00

AIC
4124.91
Final Model

year
Enrollment

Coef
.0167
.00004

Z
.48
369

95% Conf. Interval
.067
.165
1.13
1.98
BIC
4149.89

p<|z|
.629
.493

95% Conf. Interval
-.051
.084
-.00007
.0001
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Disadvantage
Assessments
Discipline
Climate
Div. Climate
Div. Assessments
Div. Discipline
Div. Measures

75
-.011
.0119
1.367
-.081
.118
-.0083
-1.16
.995

-.06
3.28
1.99
-.85
.156
-2.25
-1.24
40.67

.951
0.001**
.04*
.395
.447
.024*
.215
.000**

AIC
2849.84
School Climate
ICC
null

Division
School|Division

.07
.22

year
Climate

Coef
-.06
3.95

Z
-6.5
168.65

year
Disadvantage
Enrollment
Assessments
Physical Security
Discipline
Div. Climate
Div. Discipline
Div. Assessments

Coef
.0009
-.037
-7.18e-06
.0013
-.0019
-1.02
1.00
1.05
-.0007

Z
.01
-.65
-.41
1.17
-.33
-4.64
25.34
.303
-.67

p<|z|
0.00
0.00

null

year
Discipline

95% Conf. Interval
-.083
-.044
3.90
3.99
BIC
975.49

p<|z|
.921
.513
.683
.242
.742
0.000**
0.000**
0.000**
.502

AIC
401.45
School Discipline
ICC
Division
School|Division

.329
.019
2.71
.1064
.425
-.001
.674
1.04

BIC
2929.13

AIC
950.72
Final Model

-.351
.005
.0216
-.2695
-.187
-.0156
-2.99
.949

95% Conf. Interval
-.018
.019
-.142
.071
-.00004
.00002
-.004
.0005
-.013
0.009
-1.45
-.587
.92
1.07
.4543
1.64
-.003
.374
BIC
465.88

.20
.74
Coef
-.013
.115

Z
-13.63
23.77
AIC

p<|z|
0.00
0.00

95% Conf. Interval
-.015
-.011
.106
.125
BIC
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-3576.28

Final Model

year
Disadvantage
Enrollment
Assessments
Physical Security Measures
Climate
Div. Climate
Div. Discipline

Coef
-.00001
.0622
4.38e-06
.0002
.0002
-.004
.0066
.981

Z
-0.01
5.02
1.08
2.68
.29
-1.54
1.41
35.62
AIC
-4277.01

-.3551.31
p<|z| 95% Conf. Interval
.988
-.0016
.0016
0.000**
.038
.086
.281 -3.59e-06
.00001
.007**
.00007
.0004
.769
-.0014
.0019
.123
-.0100
.0012
.159
-.0029
.016
0.000**
.927
1.03
BIC
-4207.63

Qualitative Strand
A total of 53 threat assessment team members volunteered to participate in the threat
assessment team focus groups. Participants were sampled based on their role type and grouped by
threat assessment activity level in their respective schools. Across the nine focus groups, 38
divisions (out of 132) and 53 schools (out of 661) were represented from across the
Commonwealth. After scheduling, groups featured anywhere from 4-8 participants. There were
several no-shows on the day of the focus groups. Ultimately, focus groups ranged from 2 to 6
participants (see Figure 16 for a breakdown by region and role type) and varied from 22 minutes to
93 minutes in duration.
Figure 16
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All groups were conducted via Zoom and prompted with questions following a focus group
guide (Appendix A). Responses were recorded, transcribed, and coded. A detailed accounting of the
sessions by role type and threat assessment activity level are discussed below, including sections:
(a) Definitional, (b) Threat Assessment Operations, (c) The Threat Assessment Team, and (d)
Threat Assessment Efficacy. Each section corresponds with themes presented in the focus group
guide and addresses the research questions:
RQ1. How are threat assessment teams being utilized in K-12 schools in Virginia?
RQ3. How do threat assessment team members perceive the role and efficacy of threat
assessment in promoting school safety?
Major findings from the focus groups are presented by section in Table 7 below. The
remainder of this section provides further details of threat assessment focus groups. Each section
outlined above is noted in bold and consists of several categories which align with questions from
the Focus Group Guide (Appendix A). The categories are noted italics. Within each category is a
summary of the question posed to participants, a description of the codes applied, and a discussion
of responses, first based on role type (counseling, administration, and law enforcement) and then by
threat assessment activity level (none, average, and high). All codes, both a priori and posterior,
appear italicized. As a reference, Table 7 outlines the subsequent sections, categories, and codes
used.
Table 7
A Summary of Qualitative Findings


Most participants across role type and threat assessment activity level defined
school safety in a holistic fashion, including a combination of physical security
and school climate.



School administrators were the only grouping to define school safety in terms of
policies and procedures. This inclusion was also present in their identification on
the biggest threat to school safety.

Definitional
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Very few participants mentioned a school shooting or active shooter when
identifying the biggest threat to school safety.



Threats that originated outside of the school but caused issues during the school
day were most commonly identified as the biggest threat to school safety. These
threats included social media and bullying.



Consistent with their role type, school administrators were the only group to
include policies and procedures in their definitions of threat assessment.



Evaluations and investigations were the most commonly identified aspect in
defining threat assessment.



Across all sub-categories of threat assessment operations (team formation, team
training, and process), responses were consistent in their inconsistency,
highlighting the decentralized nature of school and division policies and
procedures. Even with the highly prescriptive nature of threat assessment,
participants across all groupings reporting procedural inconsistencies.



Of particular concern was that the process of threat assessment is seemingly not
being carried out as advised by best practices, or as advised in best practices.
Across all strata, participants reported threat assessments in their schools were not
being carried out by the full team.



Many participants noted an overall lack of resources in some schools, whether in
follow-up, staffing, training, or just a general disadvantage for students and staff.



Despite complaints about the threat assessment process and inconsistencies in
threat assessment operations, all subgroups reported an overwhelmingly positive
perception of threat assessment team dynamics.



The only negative perceptions of teams or team members appeared among
schools with low threat assessment activity.



Participants across all role types and activity levels viewed threat assessment as
an enhancement to school safety.

Definitional
Defining School Safety. To begin the focus groups, participants were asked to define school
safety as it relates to their roles in schools. Based upon the holistic interpretation of school safety,
and to align to data sources from the quantitative strand, a priori codes of physical security, school
climate, and other were developed prior to the focus groups. Codes of physical security were
applied when the participant mentioned physical security measures such as door locks, security, or
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other physical security measures. The code of climate was applied when participants mentioned any
response related to feelings or perceptions of safety. The code of other was meant to capture any
other responses. After coding was completed, a posterior code of combination was implemented as
numerous participants across focus groups described school safety in a more holistic fashion and
often combined the elements of climate and physical security to describe and define school safety.
To qualify for the code of combination, the participant had to explicitly respond in a way that would
have been coded as both climate and physical security. A combination definition of school safety
which reflected physical and climate measures was common throughout all groupings—evident
regardless of role type or threat activity level.
Among role types, the greatest degree of variation was seen with school counselors. Over
half (6/10) of all school counselors defined school safety as a combination of physical security and
school climate. No one in the school counselor focus groups described school safety in terms of just
physical security, but two participants did offer a definition that only represented school climate.
Additional responses (2/10) were categorized as other – one reflecting that school safety should not
only be defined as during school hours (but also follow students to their homes), another defining it
as “policies and procedures for the worst-case scenario.” The latter response was prevalent among
school administrators; over half (8/12) of school administrators singularly responded that school
safety was some sort of policy, procedure, or protocol that all should know. One school
administrator likened school safety to an airplane – “knowing all the exit routes so everyone can be
safe and secure.” Aside from the one school counselor who mentioned policies, this response was
uniquely present and dominant in school administrator focus groups. All other responses by school
administrators (3/12) represented a combination view of school safety that encompassed physical
security and climate. Law enforcement focus groups were in the most agreement among the
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different role types as it relates to defining school safety as only one participant defined school
safety with solely physical security while all others used a combination definition.
When grouped by threat assessment activity levels, no clear pattern emerged among
participants. Focus groups representing high activity schools showed the most variation in responses
about school safety, with over half (6/10) of participants defining school safety as a combination of
physical security and school climate, two defining in simply as school climate, and the rest (2/10)
giving responses coded as other. Participants from schools with average threat assessment activity
were evenly split when defining school safety, with half (4/8) of respondents providing a
combination response (physical security and school climate) and the other half giving a response
classified as other (the most common being “maintaining regular safety protocols”). The low
activity group was similarly split.
While no overt pattern emerged between activity groupings, two findings of note emerged
on the topic of school safety: 1) school safety professionals across role type defined school safety in
a holistic fashion, combining physical security and school climate, and 2) school administrators
were the only group to define school safety outside of this paradigm, instead considering school
safety in terms of preparedness and administrative plans, policies, and procedures.
Defining Threats to School Safety. Participants were next asked to identify the biggest
threat to school safety in their schools. A priori codes of external threats, internal threats, and other
were developed prior to the focus groups. Codes of external threats were applied when the
participant mentioned any threat that happened outside of the school, the code of internal threats
was applied when a threat was identified that occurred solely inside the school, and the code of
other was meant to be a catch-all for any other responses. After coding was completed, a posterior
code of external-to-internal threats was implemented as numerous participants across focus groups
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explicitly identified threats that began outside of the school and then became a concern internally.
To qualify for this code, participants had to be explicit in noting that the threat originated outside of
the school but caused issues inside the school grounds. While all groups provided an array of
answers, only 2 participants noted school shooters or an active shooter has the biggest threat to
school safety; one even qualified the threat as “very unlikely.”
School counselors were mixed in identifying the biggest threat to school safety; however,
responses were largely considered to be external-to-internal threats. Specifically, school
counselor’s identified social media, gang violence, prescription drug abuse, and bullying all as
concerns that originate outside of school hours/grounds but cause the most serious problems during
the school day. One counselor identified an issue that was separately classified as internal and
external, and subsequently became a concerning theme identified throughout the focus groups – a
lack of community partnerships (external threat) and a complete lack of resources (internal threat).
Additionally, school counselors identified other internal threats to safety such as drastic
generational divides between students and staff and student mental health. The latter concern was
also raised in the law enforcement focus groups along with a lack of conflict resolution and deescalation training for students, all coded as internal threats. Those in law enforcement also
identified social media and bullying as an external-to-internal threats and heightened the concern
with the example of students bringing weapons to school to address apparent external social media
disagreements. This group was also one to mention an active shooter as an external threat to school
safety. While one school administrator mentioned school shootings as an external concern, it was
coupled with a caveat that they were very unlikely to occur, and instead external-to-internal threats
were more concerning among the administrator focus group. Specifically, school administrators
identified prescription drug abuse and social media as external-to-internal threats. Social media was
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one threat that was cited in every focus group as a threat to school safety, with many participants
noting that issues (bullying, arguments, fights, gang activity) originate on social media and then
become physical on school property. School administrators represented the role most likely to list
an internal threat as the biggest concern to school safety, with participants mentioning
complacency, bullying, staff attitude and culture, inclusivity, mental health, data accountability,
school climate, and safety planning and training; the latter being an interesting pattern among
school administrators when discussing aspects of school safety which was not present in other role
types.
There were no apparent patterns across threat assessment activity as it concerns identifying
the biggest threats to school safety, as all responses were fairly evenly split within activity levels.
One exception that stands out, however, was seen in participants from schools with no threat
assessment activity. Participants from this group were the only to identify solely internal threats as
the biggest threat to school safety, while all others activity levels displayed an equal mix of internal,
external, and external-to-internal when identifying the biggest threat to school safety.
Defining Threat Assessment. Transitioning the conversation to threat assessment, focus
group participants were asked, “What does threat assessment mean to you, in your current
profession?” A priori codes were developed in line with the United States Secret Service (2004)
threat assessment definition, including Team, Identification, Evaluation/Investigation,
Classification, Action Plan, Follow-up, and Threat. Any mention of the listed words resulted in the
code being applied and, for this topic, multiple codes were applied to the same response. Across all
focus groups, no respondents defined threat assessment in a manner that included all separate
components. Both school counselors and school administrators heavily identified evaluation and
investigation as central to the meaning of threat assessment; for both groups this was followed in
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highest frequency by the code threat. School administrators were the only role type to repeatedly
identify having a procedure, supports, and a clear process in place as a part of the threat assessment
definition, a continuing pattern among this role type. Along with law enforcement participants,
school administrators, also consistently identified having an action plan as part of their definition
for threat assessment while only one school counselor included having an action plan as part of
their definition. Similarly, no school counselors included a follow-up as part of their definition of
threat assessment, while just one school administrator and one law enforcement participant
mentioned follow-ups. Although follow-ups are not explicitly part of the threat assessment process,
as suggested by several focus group participants, it is an important step to determine whether the
threat has been neutralized.
One interesting response to the threat assessment definition prompt came across all law
enforcement focus groups: paperwork. In addition to defining threat assessment as containing
evaluation, action plans, communication, and teamwork, all but one law enforcement officer
responded immediately with ‘paperwork’ to the prompt. When assessing responses by threat
assessment activity level, no clear patterns emerged except that evaluation/investigation appeared
as the top response across activity level. The emphasis on evaluation/investigation may imply that
regardless of role type, for many this is the most important, or most emphasized, aspect of threat
assessment.
Threat Assessment Operations
After establishing definitional standards across focus groups, participants were probed to
gain a clearer insight into how threat assessment teams are operating throughout the
Commonwealth.
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Team Formation. Focus group participants were asked to describe, to the best of their
knowledge, how threat assessment teams were formed in their schools, to include length of service,
selection of members, and team member consistency from year to year. Across role type and
activity level, no clear pattern emerged, which may suggest that inconsistency is prevalent across
the Commonwealth. It was clear, however, that school counselors, regardless of threat activity level,
believed that school administrators held the power in regard to threat assessment team formation, as
one participant noted “the Principal chooses,” another aptly replied “we are voluntold.” In this
particular group, another counselor concurred, noting that their team is assigned by administration
and assignment is based upon “who admin wants, not necessarily who is the best fit.” It also became
clear from school counselors that not every threat assessment is handled by the entire team or
consistent team members, as one school has a team for each grade level, made up of a school
counselor and school administrator and “only involve the SRO if it is critical or a high-level threat
because we want to be culturally aware.” Before the moderator could probe any deeper, another
school counselor responded that their “SRO is a valuable part of the team because they can pull
community information that school staff may not know.” This piecemeal processing was also
present in other schools as another counselor noted their school follows the Department of Criminal
Justice Services (DCJS) guidance 16, but that not all members participate in every threat assessment.
Perhaps the most surprising (to the other focus group members as well as the moderator) response
among school counselors came from a participant who proclaimed, “I am the threat assessment
team – I do all of the threat assessments, then I just tell the Principal.” This solo threat assessment
team did seem to be an anomaly, however, as another school counselor countered with experiences
of an expansive team, which even included division level members if the assessment was complex.
Based upon VA Code mandating the team should have members with expertise in school administration, counseling,
and law enforcement.
16
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Involvement at the division level was also reported across school administrator focus
groups. One administrator noted that their division-level threat assessment team actually conducted
all of the threat assessments in their school division and that school-level administrators acted more
as ‘fact-finders’, filling out reporting forms for the division team to conduct the final assessment.
Two other administrators reported their school will sometimes request division-level assistance if
the threat assessment is complex. Several school administrators mentioned that while membership
on the threat assessment team remained consistent from year to year, that the actual assessments
were performed based on who was available at the time, with one administrator stating that “we
have a threat assessment team on paper, but it is really just who is available at the time.” A separate
school administrator noted their full team only met when the threat was determined to be moderate
or high. Adding an extra layer of inconsistency, several school administrators reported their teams
were assigned by grade level, while others were assigned to certain letters of the alphabet
(representing student last names).
Interestingly, the law enforcement focus groups did not report the same levels of
inconsistency as the other two role types, perhaps because they are not employees of the school and
are not privy to the inner school workings. Several participants responded that their teams were
consistent from year to year and made up of the required members. Only one law enforcement
participant mentioned not being on the team for all threat assessments, noting they were only
brought in if the threat was considered moderate or high – similar to responses from those in
administration and school counseling. The theme of inconsistency persisted across threat
assessment activity levels in regard to team formation.
Team Training. A key component of conducting a threat assessment is for all team
members to be trained and to train together (Stohlman et al., 2021). Participants were asked to
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describe their threat assessment training and any training their teams had together. A priori codes
were changed upon analysis to account for nuances in responses from participants. New codes were
developed to reflect patterns among participants: Ideal, representing a description of training that
was in line with threat assessment best practices; Consistent, representing responses indicating
annual training or a high-level of training; Needs Improvement, accounting for responses that failed
to meet recommended standards but had some level of training; and None, reflecting schools with
no training whatsoever. Surprisingly, at least one participant in each category (role type and activity
level) indicated receiving no training on threat assessment, despite serving on a threat assessment
team (a code of none). Similar to team formation, inconsistency in training experiences was a
consistent pattern across all categories. Among school counselors, only one reported an ideal
training scenario in which teams across the division come together to receive annual DCJS training
and also all division staff receive a general threat assessment awareness training. At the other
extreme, two school counselors indicated receiving no training (none) with one belaboring, “no
division-level coordination, we are on our own” and another noting that “team training fell off”
years ago. The most common code, across all groupings, was consistent. For school counselors
several indicated annual training for staff or that school administrators attend division-level training
and then provide refreshers for school staff. One counselor expressed frustration with threat
assessment training stating, “not everyone goes to training, it should be in house, face-to-face with
the whole team, not just passing along materials.” This statement garnered a code of needs
improvement, a singular instance among school counselors.
Schools in need of improvement (4) was common, however, among school administrators.
Several (3) school administrators experienced similar training situations to school counselors, in
which team members attend DCJS trainings, not together, and then return to share details of the
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training with other team members. Several (4) school administrators also indicated consistent
training, noting that team members received training every year, but that teams do not train
together. Uniquely, one school administrator relayed a rather centralized threat assessment training
protocol in their division, as the division-level threat assessment team coordinator visited every
school in their division annually and trained teams together, representing an ideal training dynamic.
A member of the law enforcement focus group noted a similar ideal training experience in which
one day of the annual school resource officer (SRO) training hosted by their Sheriff’s office was
dedicated to threat assessment and school-based team members attended with the schools’ SROs.
None of the law enforcement participants responded with answers indicating a consistent code,
instead, the remaining focus group members (2) reported receiving no formal training on threat
assessment (a code of none) or only receiving generalized training or minor training of less than 30
minutes (codes of needs improvement).
The theme of inconsistency was again persistent across threat assessment activity levels with
coding differences evenly split throughout activity level. One pattern of note was that participants
from schools with no threat assessment activity were the only group in which no one described an
ideal training scenario in their schools. This pattern is not surprising, however, as it is logical that
school not practicing threat assessment training best practices would also under perform threat
assessments.
Perceptions of the Threat Assessment Process. Rounding out the threat assessment
operations questions, participants were asked to share details and thoughts on the threat assessment
process in their schools and as a whole. A priori codes of positive, negative, and other were
conceived prior to the focus groups, with a code of positive being awarded to responses reflecting
an overall positive tone, a code of negative reflecting an overall negative tone as it concerns the
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threat assessment process, and other to account for any neutral or otherwise un-codable responses.
To reflect variations in responses, a posterior code of mixed was developed to account for the wave
of responses that included both positive and negative answers from participants.
Across role type, school counselors were the only grouping that did not view the threat
assessment process in their schools in a positive light. Instead, many (4) in this grouping provided
mixed responses such as “process is good but follow through isn’t what it should be and
administration do not always follow our recommendations and overrides team determinations,
maybe because trained members are not always available so it’s whomever it free” or “most [staff]
are now on board but there is still push back on the formula” and “threat assessment is supported,
but largely for the checkbox or just for documentation.” Even more (9) school counselors reported
negative views of the process, stating “if people followed the actual process, in theory is it good, the
steps make sense, but we have lost sight of what the right way even is.” Negative responses centered
around the process itself, with some counselors reporting “lots of repetition in the process, lots of
changes on the fly, and the documents feel antiquated and robotic” or that the process is “very
clerical, I am afraid students get lost in the policy and procedures, [it is] lots of paperwork.” This
sentiment was prevalent across school counselor groups with others noting “we do threat
assessment just to cover ourselves” and “it should be a team process, but usually just one person
does it” and “we have a protocol, but no one follows it, usually just one person does it – me, and
discipline comes from my meeting, which is inappropriate.” The latter statement garnered
agreement from another counselor who concurred “I am not a disciplinarian, so it can be a huge
waste of time – it is not functioning correctly.” Perhaps the most negative response came from a
counselor who earlier in the focus group noted not having many resources in their division, relayed
that “I am the threat assessment team, we have no team, it is very scary and ethically problematic
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with lots of pressure on me.” This declaration again garnered shock and sympathy from other
participants.
Opinions on the threat assessment process were more favorable among school
administrators, with few (2) responses being coded negative. Negative responses from school
administrators centered around the structured nature of threat assessment, such as “central office
instituted a formulized threat assessment process with specific protocols, for the day-to-day it is
very rigid and top down with little room for input” and that the process “can be hindering at times –
lots of forms to fill out that draw attention away from the actual situation, filling out forms is a twoperson job.” Conversely, several (3) school administrators viewed the structure positively noting
the process is “streamlined” and provide “clear cut procedures with directives and forms from
central office.” One administrator positively reflected that “team specifics and protocols come from
the State and central office, but we [their school] have a lot of flexibility, the process is helpful in
leading to outcomes and only gotten better over the years” and frankly noting that “the process is
good, can’t complain.” Several administrators (5) provided mixed reviews of the threat assessment
process with many indicating the “process is fine” or “we take it seriously” but had complaints such
as the “protocols feel designed for a larger school system, not smaller ones. [I am] not dismissive of
the process as a whole, it just doesn’t quite fit.” Others agreed that the process “can be hindering
because it is so structured.”
The sentiment surrounding the structured nature of threat assessment also appeared among
school resource officers with one noting the process “could be more streamlined” and that the
“police department’s version is shorter, the schools’ is long and redundant – it is good but could be
more concise.” Mixed responses such as these were common in the law enforcement focus groups,
but this role type viewed the threat assessment process most positively as compared with other role
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types. Participants from the law enforcement focus groups only provided positive (5) and mixed (3)
responses. Those coded in the former commented, “it is a good, researched process” and an
“important part of the job that gives everyone a good sense at the end.” One SRO noted “the team
dynamic is crucial because we all wear different hats and bring different expertise and feedback,”
with another SRO concurring and elaborating that the process was “good and needed, especially for
follow-up and documentation.”
When analyzed by threat assessment activity level, responses were fairly mixed throughout,
with no clear pattern emerging. Overall, however, from a team operations standpoint, the pattern of
inconsistency began to appear. Whether in reporting on team formation, team training, or team
process, focus group participants, across role type and threat assessment activity levels, were
consistently inconsistent concerning threat assessment operations within their individual schools
and divisions.
The Threat Assessment Team
After discussing perceptions of the threat assessment process, participants were probed
deeper about threat assessment teams, specifically regarding team dynamics, times the team worked
well together and when they did not, about power dynamics, and about any changes participants
would like to see as it concerns threat assessment teams in their schools.
Team Dynamics. The first in a series of prompts about threat assessment teams asked
participants to reflect on dynamics within threat assessment teams at their schools. Responses were
coded similar to codes applied to threat assessment process: positive, mixed, negative, and other.
Unlike their thoughts on threat assessment processes, school counselors’ responses were
overwhelmingly positive and mixed, with no responses being coded as negative. In contrast to their
views on the threat assessment process in their respective schools, school counselors
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overwhelmingly described team dynamics in a positive light as compared to other role types. In
fact, the school counselor focus groups were the only role type to not have any responses coded as
negative. Over half (6) of school counselors reported positive team dynamics within their schools,
claiming “we have the greatest team” and that their team “works well together – we have a good
flow and depend on each other… we are always willing to grow and adapt.” Yet another counselor
stated their “school and team works well, the school supports the team.” This was a common
sentiment among school counselors as one reported that “everyone has a common goal and the work
is important,” with another counselor agreeing, “we’re all on the same page and work well
together.” Even counselors who did not view their team completely in a positive light gave
responses coded as mixed (4), for example stating their team “works well together, but lots of room
for improvement.” Another mixed response described that “working with others can be a blessing or
a curse, sometimes you have too many hands in the pot.” This particular response garnered
agreement among other group members with a counselor adding that their team has “no big
disagreements, [but] more disagreements around appropriate consequences.”
Similar to the rather positive responses from school counselors, school administrators were
divided between positive (10) and negative (7) responses. Several administrators (4) who reported
positive team dynamics were not very verbose or expansive in their responses with many simply
stating “no disagreements.” Others, however, reported their teams operated “fairly smoothly” and
elaborated that “all members come to the table with info and has the opportunity to be heard, their
voices have value – it helps in sharing info so everyone understands the context” and that “bringing
in the whole team helps to catch things only one person may have missed.” In contrast,
administrators who reported negative views often pinpointed specific team members affecting the
team dynamics, mainly school counselors. For example, one administrator noted experiencing
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“some disagreements around code of ethics for counselors – what info they are willing to share,
sometimes background knowledge helps us understand the threat, but we have had disagreements
about what they felt should be disclosed and we have made false decisions because we did not have
information.” As a follow-up to this statement, another administrator agreed and expressed there
was “disagreement around communication as they choose not to disclose because it violates
students’ rights.” One school administrator admitted to being the source of disagreements in their
threat assessment team, stating “I’m the disagreement, some admin try to make things more serious
just so they can remove students from the school environment, I stop that.”
Other administrators responding negatively centered on various conditions in their schools
or divisions as the source of any negative team dynamics. One administrator cited politics and
national events coloring assessment in their school as team members were “hyper vigilant, which
created a weird dynamic,” while others noted specific challenges such as “we need more training
and resources for follow-up.” Two other administrators also cited resources: “we are under
resourced with an SRO and school counselor that covers three counties.” The conversation around
resources and staff coverage was also present among law enforcement focus groups whose views of
team dynamics were evenly split between positive (2), mixed (2), and negative (2) codes. One SRO
reported that in their division “SROs are short-staffed, cover multiple schools, and are just spread
thin, so it is hard to develop relationships in schools… we should be included more, but are not and
miss a lot.” This particular SRO also discussed the political climate in their division, stating “some
admins will hide information and some will overshare, under-sharing limits the resources and
services kids can get.” Other SROs countered that while their team “works well together, there are
times when the school and law enforcement see things differently – the school sometimes makes a
mountain out of a molehill and I have to explain why a kid was not arrested. The school tends to go

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

93

from 0-60 rather quickly.” While several SROs addressed issues within their teams and schools,
others were complimentary of the team, reflecting “I’m fortunate to work at only one school and I
have a tight relationship with the principal and team here;” “the team dynamic is crucial because we
all wear different hats and bring different expertise and feedback;” and “it’s just majority rules, no
power struggles, and any uncertainty goes to Central Office – I am very lucky and fortunate.”
Views of team dynamics also displayed an interesting, yet not surprising, pattern across
threat assessment activity levels. All negative (9) views of threat assessment team dynamics
clustered within the no activity groupings. Participants from high activity schools reported a mix
between positive (10) impressions and mixed (2) perceptions of team dynamics, while participants
from average activity presented a similar mix between positive (8) and mixed (2) perceptions.
Overall, focus group participants overwhelmingly viewed threat assessment team dynamics in a
positive (18) light, with many less providing responses coded as mixed (6), and negative (9).
Power Differentials. Following a discussion of team dynamics, participants were asked
about power dynamics within their particular school threat assessment teams. A priori codes of
concentrated and dispersed were originally developed in line with prior research on team power
dynamics (Greer et al., 2017; Tarakci et al, 2016). However, after numerous attempts to redirect in
session, and upon multiple readings of the transcripts, it became clear the question, and subsequent
prompts, were not eliciting the intended responses from all participants. Instead, a summary of
responses by role type is provided.
School counselors were rather split in their perceptions of power dynamics among threat
assessment teams in their schools. Two counselors believed that there is equal power between their
role and school administrators, noting “counselors and administration meet, have a discussion, and
make decisions, but not the whole team.” Another counselor implied they themselves held much of
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the power when it comes to threat assessment, stating “counselors do the initial assessment and
decide to escalate to the whole team.” If there were a common sentiment among counselors, it was
this as another noted that in their school threat assessment “defaults to counselors, administration
would just rather we take care of it” with another concurring “it defers back to counselors,
administration comes in at the end and defers to the work already completed – there are never any
feuds.” Other counselors, however, felt very strongly that administration held the power when it
came to threat assessment, stating “administrators make the final decision and they do not go to
training” and “it is very clear that admin is the decision-maker, they get the final call and I’m happy
with that.” Similarly, one counselor reported “we are all equal members on the team, but
administration can overrule the team decision, they make the final decision.” Only one counselor
reported differently, noting there is an “even dynamic among team members, we escalate even if
one member feels it.”
Among school administrators, it appeared to be a consensus that administrators held the
ultimate power in the group, but that all team members had an equal say. For example, one
administrator reported “everyone has a voice and admin has the final say is not mutually exclusive –
I am comfortable advocating for my position, but it is ultimately the Principal’s call.” Five other
administrators agreed with this position, with one noting “I would not feel comfortable with a final
decision if it was not the consensus.” Other administrators viewed team power dynamics as much
more harmonious, noting “we trust one another and know we have the same goal – no power
struggles” and “some passions within the team, but we all have an equal say.” One administrator
noted their dynamics in detail, saying “a counselor or administrator initiates the process, and we
disagree all the time, but more on intervention strategies, not level of threat. We settle

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL

95

disagreements on consensus, and everyone shares power. We have an agreement with local law
enforcement, and they do not take action unless the threat is imminent, or we request it.”
Amongst school resource officers, there was also a split in perception of power on the threat
assessment team. One participant seemed to view the process and power positively noting
“everyone gets a say and I feel equal on my time. Central Office are the real gatekeepers, any
disagreements go to Central Office and they can order a threat assessment to be redone if it is done
incorrectly.” Two other SROs agreed the principal had the most power, reporting “I don’t have a lot
of power in my division, the Principal makes the final decision.” Another SRO reported that while
they did not have “a good relationship with my school administrator and we do not share
information, but the threat assessment team respects my opinions.” Ultimately, when it comes to
power dynamics on the threat assessment team, no clear patterns emerged.
Recommendations for Change. To round out the threat assessment team questions,
participants were asked if there were any changes they would make to threat assessment at their
schools. Posterior codes were created to reflect responses provided across categories. The code
resources was applied to responses that recommended adding more members, funding, or other
resources to the threat assessment teams. A code of training was applied to participants
recommending more or different training. The code process was applied to comments
recommending changes to the school’s threat assessment process and the code of follow-up was
applied to responses that advocated for changes to procedures after a threat assessment is
conducted. Recommendations could receive multiple codes.
School counselors were very mixed in their recommendations with mentions of needed
changes to resources (5), training (3), process (8), and follow-up (5) throughout groupings. School
administrators were similarly mixed as participants recommended changes to resources (1), training
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(2), process (5), and follow-up (4) throughout groupings. Only one school administrator answered
that no changes were needed. Similarly, one school resource officer had no recommended changes
while others recommended changes to resources (1), training (1), process (2). Responses were
similarly dispersed across threat activity level. Under the heading of resources, several participants
just mentioned how under-resourced their schools and divisions were: “schools should not be the
only resource hub,” or their divisions should “hire more counselors and give more resources all
around” or “we need more SROs to cover schools so we can build relationships with school
personnel, understaffing leads to a lack of consistency,” another noting specifically that “I just wish
we had more resources, our CSB (Community Services Board) has a lot of turnover and our high
risk kids really need continuity.”
Recommendations for more training were fairly straightforward across focus groups, with
several participants recommending that “every go to training” and that it be “face-to-face, in house
so that teams can train together.” Suggestions for consistency were also present in responses aimed
at the threat assessment process, for example “I don’t like filling out forms” or “it is a lot of
paperwork, we need to make it easier and more streamlined” and “consistency throughout the whole
school division” would be helpful.
Threat Assessment Efficacy
To close out each focus group, participants were prompted to reflect upon the definitions of
school safety they provided at the beginning of the session. Participants were then asked if they
believed threat assessment to be effective at enhancing school safety. A priori codes of positive,
mixed, and negative were then applied to participant responses. Across all focus groups, no
participants provided responses that were categorized as negative. The most positive responses
occurred across the law enforcement focus groups with all but one providing a positive response.
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When asked if threat assessment enhances school safety, three SROs responded “absolutely” with
one elaborating “it gets kids the services they haven’t had, services they desperately need, it is
incredibly helpful to catch kids that would have slipped through the cracks.” Another SRO agreed
stating “it can alert more people to an issue and kids get more resources – it triggers a system to fix
things.” The sentiment of providing services seemed a common expression throughout all focus
groups and underscores the thought of school safety as holistic in nature. For some, the recognition
of the threat, and the subsequent actions, enhanced school safety, stating “it opens lines of
communication and acknowledges a threat and addresses it before it gets worse,” with others adding
that threat assessment is “definitely effective – it makes us more aware and more confident” and
“just having knowledge that you dove in and offered assistance, analyzed the situation, and
mitigated a threat – I don’t know what we did in the past, but I couldn’t imagine doing this job
without threat assessment, it gets positive conclusions.” Even the one SRO who provided a response
coded as mixed viewed the effectiveness in a positive light, but complained about the process
stating, “it really does help, but it can be a pain – it is 10% awesome, 90% paperwork.”
Several (3) school administrators also provided conditional responses that were coded as
mixed, for example that threat assessment was effective “if done correctly” or “it is effective, but we
do not use our team as much as we should.” All other school administrators (8) provided positive
responses, such as “Yes [it is effective] and way better than the nothing we had before, no more
dropping the ball like in the past” and “numerous cases are easy to deescalate the potential for
violence because of interventions, conversations, and engagement – it enhances school safety.”
Another administrator noted, “school is definitely a safer place for having it because there’s
situations that have come through that we’ve been able to mitigate because of the process –
definitely worthwhile.”
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In comparison to other role types, while no school counselors reported negative perceptions,
those in this grouping were more likely to provide conditional statements (8) about threat
assessment and school safety. For example, one counselor noted “big picture, it would be better if
we had more resources to be proactive rather than reactive – it is important and helpful though” and
“it’s a blessing and a curse, lots of pressure but a good process.” Another noted that threat
assessment is “excellent if used properly – we skip over so much – we don’t even do it correctly, it
has the potential to be good, but I’m not sure if it is effective right now.” Two other school
counselors responded with a positive assessment of threat assessment and school safety, stating
“I’ve seen how it can keep the school safe, it’s never done the opposite, it has never put us in a more
risky position” and “sometimes we learn something new about a kid and we are able to put
resources in place to make them and us safer.” Responses were similarly mixed across threat
activity level, with no clear patterns, except participants mostly viewed threat assessment as having
a positive impact on school safety.
Data Integration
Once the quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed, the two strands were
merged using an integration through narrative method. Results of the two strands were compared
by theme, specially by research question (Fetters et al., 2013). For ease of understanding, the
merged results are presented in a joint display to showcase topical findings from the two strands
(Creswell, 2014). Findings are displayed in the integration matrix displayed below (Table 9) and are
discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter. The table is presented by research question,
outlining contributions from the quantitative and qualitative strand and also includes a fit of
integration designation. As outlined by Fetters and colleagues (2013), the designations include:
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Confirmation - findings from the two strands confirm one another, which produces
similar conclusions and enhanced credibility;

-

Expansion - findings from the two strands diverge from one another and expand insights
through addressing the differing and complementary aspects;

-

Discordance - findings from the two strands are inconsistent, contradictory, or in
complete disagreement.
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Table 8
Data Integration
Theme

Quantitative

Qualitative

Fit of Integration

Use of threat assessments has
increased over time in
secondary schools.

Questions of overall lack of
fidelity to threat assessment
guidelines, particularly
concerns over consistency in
the process, training, and
resources. Highlighting the
inconsistencies in threat
assessment operations
across schools.

Expansion – qualitative
findings expand upon
quantitative findings providing
context and insights.

School safety was
consistently defined in a
holistic manner,
encompassing physical
security and school climate.

Expansion

Threat Assessment
in Schools

Threat Assessment
& School Safety

Physical Security

Increases in threat
assessments are associated
with increases in physical
security measures.

School Climate

Increases in threat
assessments are not associated
with reported feelings of
safety in schools.

School Discipline

While threat assessments have
increased, concerns remain
regarding implementation
fidelity and resource
availability.
Practitioners consistently
viewed school safety in a
holistic fashion as mirrored by
the use of three different
outcome variables all as school
safety.

External threats that
manifested internally at
school were identified as the Across outcomes, quantitative
biggest threat to school
findings were inconsistent,
safety.
which were consistent with
Threat assessment teams
qualitative views on threat
themselves were
assessment processes.
consistently
viewed
in
a
Increases in threat
assessments are not associated positive light. Threat
assessment was noted as a
with exclusionary discipline.
valuable enhancement to
school safety.
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Discussion
The present study focused on the threat assessment process in the K-12 environment in
Virginia since the introduction of a threat assessment team mandate in 2013 and explored the
association between the use of threat assessment and school safety outcomes. This project was the
first to assess this association in tandem over time and the first to incorporate the views of K-12
threat assessment practitioners. To do so, this analysis employed a concurrent parallel mixed
methods design with a pragmatic lens, addressing an important gap in the threat assessment, school
safety, educational, and public policy fields. To address that gap, this study utilized a curated school
safety database which combined several independent administrative data sources and executed eight
multi-level models in the quantitative strand, results of which were compared to an analysis of nine
focus groups of K-12 threat assessment team members which spanned the professional roles of
school administration, school counseling, and school resource officer.
The first key finding from this study is that while the number of threat assessments increased
across the study period (2013-2020), threat assessment practitioners identified numerous concerns
regarding threat assessment training, lack of fidelity to the recommended process, and an overall
inconsistency in the implementation of threat assessment and resource availability across the
Commonwealth. A second key finding was that threat assessment practitioners consistently view
school safety in a holistic capacity and consider threat assessment to be an enhancement to school
safety (when it is implemented correctly). Increases in threat assessment were not found to be
statistically associated with all aspects of school safety, as only physical security measures
maintained a positive association with increases in threat assessment, while there was no association
between threat assessment and school climate or exclusionary discipline. A third finding was that
while many practitioners viewed power as evenly distributed among team members, it was apparent
that in practice school administrators held the power in school, especially as it concerned threat
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assessment operations. The following discussion details the mixed methods findings and
contextualizes results in the threat assessment literature while discussing broader policy
implications. Limitations to the current study are also discussed, as well as areas for future research.
Threat Assessment Utilization
Since the passage of the threat assessment mandate in 2013, there has been a statistically
significant increase in threat assessment activity across middle and high schools in Virginia.
Specifically, threat assessment in middle schools was found to have increased by a rate of 1.34
every year, while threat assessment in high schools increased at a similar rate of 1.36 every year. On
average, middle schools in Virginia were performing 6.59 threat assessments annually in 2013 and
13.59 by 2019. Similarly, high schools in Virginia were performing 5.62 threat assessment on
average in 2013 and 11.65 by 2020. The increase in threat assessment activity was not entirely
surprising given the growth in attention paid to the topic over the past decade. As of 2019, 31 pieces
of legislation concerning implementing threat assessment teams in K-12 public schools had been
proposed across 19 states, with 28 of said bills being introduced since 2017 (Smith & Cleary, in
preparation). Additionally, as of 2017, 39 states provided some form of clear online resources on
developing and/or implementing a school-based threat assessment team (Woitaszewski et al., 2017).
For the 2017-2018 school year, 43.7% of public schools across the United States reported having
some version of a threat assessment team in their school (National Center for Education Statistics,
2019). The number of schools throughout the country using threat assessment has only grown since
then, due in part to availability of federal funding for threat assessment through the federal STOP
School Violence Act of 2018 (Burnett et al., 2020). With this growth and support at the state and
federal level, it is imperative to continue to study the implementation and impacts of threat
assessment utilization in schools.
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Inconsistencies in Threat Assessment Operations
While the current research confirms the use of threat assessments increased over the study
period, it also delves into more detail about the implementation and utilization of threat assessment
in K-12 public schools in Virginia. Through focus groups with threat assessment practitioners, it
became apparent that while practitioners viewed threat assessment as a valuable and worthwhile
tool to use in schools, there were significant concerns and inconsistencies with the implementation
and day-to-day practice of threat assessment.
Defining Threat Assessment. Beginning with the perceived definition of threat assessment,
most practitioners, regardless of role type, defined threat assessment in the context of investigating
and evaluating threats when they arise. While those components are at the crux of threat assessment,
the process is much more involved. Specifically, absent from much of the conversation around the
definition of threat assessment was the concept of follow-up. In threat assessment practice, followup focuses on the triage and after action of not only the subject of the threat assessment but also on
any identified targets of the threat. Failure to properly follow-up after a threat assessment could lead
to further disciplinary issues or an escalation of the threatening behavior. This was the case in a
recent school shooting in which the threat assessment team failed to issue any sort of follow-up
after the threat assessment, ultimately leading to the subject of the threat assessment killing another
classmate (Goodrum et al., 2018). A case study of legal depositions after the incident uncovered the
school failed to monitor the implementation of threat assessment and as a result threat assessment
was not being conducted with fidelity in accordance with threat assessment guidance and best
practices (Goodrum et al., 2018). If threat assessment is not conceptualized in a holistic manner,
considering all aspects of the threat assessment process, the process defaults to a simple
investigation and evaluation loop, and becomes no different than regular disciplinary processes.
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Fidelity to not only the threat assessment guidelines but also the conceptual threat assessment
processes is important to ensure threat assessments achieve their intended goal – mitigating a threat
and desisting the threatener from their pathway to violence, in the short and long term. To
accomplish this, follow-up must be considered and implemented as a part of every threat
assessment.
Threat Assessment Operations. An additional finding from the after-action report of the
school active shooter incident, along with a lack of follow-up, was that the school also failed to
follow basic threat assessment procedures. For instance, the threat assessment team only used an
untrained school administrator and a minimally trained to conduct the schools’ threat assessments
(Goodrum et al., 2018). These findings were similar to those within the after-action report for the
Marjory Stoneman Douglass school shooting which noted that despite being identified numerous
times as a person of concern, staff were neither properly trained nor engaged in the threat
assessment process, thus contributing to the death of students by the person of concern (MSD
Public Safety Commission, 2020). Shortly after, Florida passed mandated threat assessment and
training (among other items) legislation for K-12 schools. While actual instances of targeted
violence in K-12 schools remain low (Nekvasil et al., 2015), what is concerning are the echoes of
these failings taking place in middle and high schools across Virginia.
Repeatedly, threat assessment team members across role types cited inconsistencies in the
formation and utilization of threat assessment teams in their schools. Specifically, members
reported that the entire threat assessment team does not usually complete the assessments and it is
often only the school counselor and school administrator, or in one case just the school counselor.
Several practitioners noted school resource officers being excluded from the threat assessment
process, while others reported only involving the SRO when the threat was already classified as
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high-level or serious. Other practitioners noted that staff at their respective school divisions were
the ones to conduct threat assessments, and the school-level administrators acted simply as ‘factfinders’ and funneled information to those at the division level. Perhaps the most demonstrative of
the inconsistencies in threat assessment operations came with several school administrators
reporting that threat assessments were performed by “who is available at the time”, neglecting the
multi-disciplinary guidance inherent in the threat assessment process.
This is concerning on numerous fronts. Threat assessment is designed and built upon the
idea of using multi-disciplinary teams to assess, triage, and follow-up upon threats within schools.
This study demonstrated that threat assessments have been increasing year after year, a finding that
underscores the necessity that this growing tool be conducted correctly, with all available resources.
Per Virginia code, and all threat assessment guidance, teams are to be made up of members with
expertise in administration, counseling, and law enforcement (Virginia Department of Criminal
Justice Services, 2017). Each member brings different knowledge and experience to the team
(Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). Without the presence of the full team, members may be lacking
key information that can provide much needed context to the threat assessment (O’Toole, 1999; US
Secret Service, 2004). For example, multiple school resource officers, and school administrators,
noted the value members law enforcement contribute to the threat assessment team in the form of
information sharing. Specifically, law enforcement representatives are often able to share
community-based information (such as calls for service or arrest reports) on the targets’ out-ofschool life that may contribute to the threat assessment evaluation and follow-up plan.
Information Sharing. Regarding information sharing, several school administrators cited
issues on their teams with those in school counselor roles who often refused to share information
due to “ethical concerns” over student privacy. While this concern may be valid for counseling
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professionals, it is counter to the threat assessment process which relies on information sharing to
create a snapshot of the situation and collect contextual information to appropriately situate,
classify, and mitigate the threat. Additionally, legislation has been passed in Virginia to provide for
the sharing of student records for the purposes of conducting a threat assessment (Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2017). The 2016 bill from the Commonwealth of Virginia
modified existing legislation to specifically allow threat assessment teams to access educational,
criminal, and medical records. Records sharing provides teams with the most information to make
appropriate recommendations and service provisions. This legislative update does provide statutory
authority for the sharing of sensitive records, superseding FERPA or HIPAA concerns, often cited
as areas of confusion for schools (Louvar Reeves & Brock, 2018).
The ability to share information between employees, schools, and agencies is critical for the
contextual component of threat assessment. In threat assessments, threats are viewed as contextual,
dynamic, and continuous (Borum et al., 1999). As such, gathering information from a variety of
sources is crucial to understanding all aspects of the target of the assessment to enhance the ability
to make an informed evaluation of the seriousness of the threat and develop an appropriate action
and follow-up plan (Meloy et al., 2012). The ecological systems approach to threat assessment
relies on the sharing of any relevant, available information to assess and triage, ultimately (and
ideally) desisting the target off their pathway of violence (O’Toole, 2000). While it was concerning
to hear of these inconsistencies, some participants noted an open and positive relationship on their
team, in which all members, in various role types, shared information freely to achieve the ultimate
goal – helping to keep students and the school community safe. Perhaps a portion of these
inconsistencies can be explained by another concerning trend reported by threat assessment team
members – a lack of adequate training on threat assessment.
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Training. Similar to patterns across threat assessment operations within schools, was a
tremendous amount of inconsistency in the type and intensity of threat assessment training. While
several team members reported ideal training situations, including yearly refreshers, intensive tabletop exercises, and team-based training, others noted a complete lack of training in their schools and
within their school divisions. Even more concerning were reports that entire teams operating and
assessing threats in schools had never received training on threat assessment at all. As demonstrated
by this analysis, the use of threat assessment has grown exponentially in middle and high schools.
As such, it is crucial that the assessments are being carried out by trained professionals.
Being able to recognize, evaluate, classify, and develop after action plans are all critical
elements of the threat assessment process (Borum et al., 1999). Being properly trained in threat
assessment can enhance practitioners’ ability to ultimate mitigate a threat. Conducting threat
assessments with no or limited training could hinder the ability to do so, especially since evidence
exists that threat assessment training works. For example, Allen and colleagues (2008) found that a
two-day threat assessment workshop for 350 school personnel increased threat assessment
knowledge and the degree of accuracy in classification of threat assessment cases. Similarly,
Cornell and colleagues (2011) found that three half-day workshops increased threat assessment
knowledge for 142 personnel and improved their ability to distinguish between serious and nonserious threats. Most recently, Stohlman and colleagues (2020) found that regardless of role type,
experience level, or demographics, a half-day threat assessment training demonstrated increased
knowledge of threat assessment and classification accuracy in a sample of 4666 practitioners across
100 workshops. While these gains demonstrate the ability to learn about threat assessment, perhaps
what school-based threat assessment teams need most is training on the threat assessment process
and fidelity to threat assessment guidance.
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Resources. In relation to training, an additional issue uncovered in threat assessment team
focus groups was a lack of resources, especially in rural areas of the state. A recent study by Hall
and colleagues (2020) found that while there are numerous free threat assessment resources online,
training is mainly awareness based and lacks in providing information on implementation and
interventions. In addition to the noted the need for threat assessment training in their schools, many
practitioners cited the overall lack of resources as the crux of the challenges they faced surrounding
threat assessment utilization. Specifically, several practitioners mentioned needing more staff
(school counselors and school resource officers) to help create consistency and improve
relationships, citing high turnover as in issue in providing follow-up and resources to students after
they have been processed by the threat assessment team. As staff are performing more and more
threat assessments each year, having sufficient staff coverage is crucial to cover the needed demand
that threat assessment entails.
High turnover and the need for more resources are not uncommon in any public sector field,
especially in light of “the great resigning” currently impacting the labor force (Klein, 2021). It
increasingly seems that school personnel and law enforcement alike are being asked to do more
with less and wear multiple hats in their job duties (Westervelt, 2021; Wilson, 2020). This challenge
is particularly concerning in light of several practitioners highlighting a lack of fidelity to the threat
assessment process and implementation guidelines. Threat assessment is in and of itself a detailoriented process which requires high levels of information gathering, collaboration, and after-action
planning (and a lot of paperwork according to several team members), all of which siphon time,
energy, and mental capacity from an already overworked, stressed, and underpaid staff.
The issues enumerated by threat assessment team members highlight another larger issue – a
lack of standardization throughout the Commonwealth. As highlighted previously, practitioners
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were consistent in their inconsistency, stressing the broad differences in school divisions and law
enforcement agencies throughout the Commonwealth. The lack of resources and standardization
could be due to the fact that Virginia cities and counties have more economic disparity between
them than any other state in the United States (Yancey, 2021). While one division represented the
ideal training (in-house, team-based, multi-day), process (full team participation), and follow-up
(resources) threat assessment procedures, others conveyed the opposite extreme – literally being the
only school counselor in an entire division and solely responsible for conducting all threat
assessment in the division with zero resources to devote to follow-ups for students. Due to the
decentralized nature of many of our institutions, there is a lack of standardization across schools,
leading to consistent inconsistency in threat assessment implementation, training, and overall
resources in schools. Research on the ability of K-12 schools to appropriately implement evidencebased practices shows that Virginia schools are not alone in their inconsistency as only 44% of
schools met the criteria for effective implementation of evidence-based practices (Gottfredson &
Gottfredson, 2011). Future research is needed to explore the variance across the entire threat
assessment process throughout Virginia.
Threat Assessment and School Safety
The current project also explored the association between threat assessment and school
safety overall. In addition to increases in threat assessments by middle and high schools, threat
assessment was also found to have mixed effects on school safety outcomes. Threat assessment
practitioners consistently defined school safety as a combination of physical security and school
climate. In terms of school safety, this analysis conceptualized school safety as an amalgam of
physical security measures, school climate, and school discipline – which was mirrored in the
selection of threat assessment team member role types (school resource officers, school counselors,
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and school administrators, respectively). This study’s quantitative approach of examining school
safety in a holistic fashion, incorporating physical security, school climate, and school discipline
triangulated with the holistic definition to school safety provided by focus group practitioners.
Physical Security
Physical security measures have increased over the study period in middle and high schools
by a rate of 1.3 per year. This increase in large part was driven by the increases in school resource
officers and school security officer in schools. Across the nation there has been an increase in the
former since the advent of the SRO program in the 1950s, with marked increases since the late
1990s and the events of the Columbine High School shooting (Counts et al., 2018; Weistburst,
2019; Lawson et al., 2021). The present study found a statistically significant, positive association
between the number of threat assessments performed annually and the number of physical security
measures in schools. Specifically, that as the number of threat assessment increased, so too did the
number of physical security measures within schools. This finding was consistent across middle and
high schools. An interesting finding within the physical security models was that as physical
security measures increased, so too did rates of school discipline. This could, however, be because
SROs are often assigned to school with higher rates of violence and suspensions (Lawson et al.,
2021). It is clear, however, that further research exploring the association between physical security,
especially the presence and use of SROs, and threat assessment is needed.
Throughout the focus groups with threat assessment practitioners, the relationship between
school administrators and SROs seemed inconsistent. While some school administrators reported
relying heavily on their SRO for support, information, and student follow-up, others reported being
apprehensive about calling in the SRO for fear of due to wanting to be “culturally aware” or only
utilizing the SRO as when threats were classified as serious.. Similar inconsistencies were reported
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by SROs, with one reporting that in their division SROs cover multiple schools and are unable to
develop relationships in schools, even to the point that some school administrators will hide
information from the SRO, ultimately limiting the resources and services that students can receive.
Conversely, another SROs reported have a “tight” relationship within their school and being
involved in every threat assessment fully. Even more drastic, one SRO described their school
administrator as an “over-sharer” and detailed scenarios in which the school made “a mountain out
of a molehill” and the SRO had to explain why a student should not be arrested, but instead be
referred to counseling services. It seems that schools, like the rest of the United States, are grappling
with a diverse view of the use of law enforcement in schools, including whether to continue having
SROs in schools at all (King & Schindler, 2021), despite the support among school staff, parents,
and students to keep SROs in schools (Cornell et al., 2021; Fletcher, 2021; Pauly, 2021). These
inconsistencies again highlight the need for further research on the association between the use of
law enforcement in schools and threat assessment.
Lastly, as it concerns physical security measures, an interesting finding was the physical
security measures were not associated with school climate. This is potentially a fascinating finding
in light of prior research. In a 2016 systematic review, Reingle Gonzalez and colleagues found that
across 32 studies, increases in security measures, particularly SROs, were associated with increases
in student and staff perception of safety within their schools. In contrast, other studies demonstrated
a decline in objective measures of safety just as rates of victimization and exclusionary discipline
(Reingle Gonzalez et al., 2016). This could again, however, be indicative of the fact that physical
security measures are more likely to be found in schools with higher behavioral, crime, and other
safety-related issues (Fisher et al., 2020). In Virginia, school climate surveys consistently indicate
that students and staff feel safer with an SRO in school (Cornell et al., 2021), even as some
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divisions have eliminated or are considering eliminating SROs in their schools (Domen, 2021).
Ultimately, this inconsistency has led to an interesting school policy crossroads, especially in light
of threat assessment. Given the mandate to include a team member with expertise in law
enforcement, and guidance to include law enforcement on multi-disciplinary threat assessment
teams, and after-action reports citing failures to operate threat assessment teams in the
recommended fashion, if schools choose to end partnerships with SROs, schools must grapple with
how exactly the mandate will be fulfilled. Schools should consider the potential ethical, legal, and
safety ramifications of failing to adhere to threat assessment guidelines, especially in the worst-case
scenario of targeted violence on school grounds. With this consideration in mind, future research is
recommended to explore the association between threat assessment, school climate, and physical
security in more depth.
Threat Assessment & School Climate
Another school safety outcome examined in this analysis was school climate. For this
project, school climate was conceptualized as students’ perception of safety. The inclusion of school
climate as a part of school safety was supported; middle schools reported a high and consistent
rating of agreement with the statement “I feel safe at this school” (4 out of 5), while feelings of
safety have been declining in high schools by a small margin each year (.06). Within the school
climate model, threat assessment and school climate were found to not be associated, failing to
provide support a hypothesis within the study. Prior research found that schools using threat
assessment procedures developed by researchers from the University of Virginia were associated
with increases in school climate as compared to other threat assessment procedures (Nekvasil &
Cornell, 2015; Cornell, 2013; Cornell et al., 2012; Cornell et al., 2009).
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School climate was, however, associated with exclusionary discipline practices, though the
direction of the association was mixed. For example, in middle schools, increases in school climate
were associated with increases in rates of exclusionary discipline at the division level (by a rate of
1.56) but a decrease in rates of exclusionary discipline at the school level (by a rate of -1.81), these
patterns were similar among high schools (with rates of 1.0 and -1.02, respectively). This could
indicate that some schools might operate independently of their division, or that there is a greater
variation within a division in school disciplinary practices. In contrast, divisions may exercise more
control over the schools within their division, resulting in similar disciplinary practices and school
climate, resulting in less variation within the division. . Although outside the school of this study,
studies on school climate are vast and future research should continue to explore this connection in
more depth, especially in the light of a growing movement towards alternatives to suspension
(Owen et al., 2015).
Threat Assessment & School Discipline
Although not traditionally considered an aspect of school safety, discipline practices have
often been used as a proxy for school-based violence and a measure for overall school safety. Over
the study period, this analysis found that both middle schools and high schools have experienced a
small, but statistically significant decline in rates of exclusionary discipline in schools each year (.12 and -.01, respectively). While small, this decline is consistent with overall trends in schools to
reduce the number of suspensions and expulsions in light of reports on disproportionate suspension
practices and awareness of the school-to-prison pipeline (APA, 2020). Disciplinary outcomes have
also featured at the core of much of the existing literature on threat assessment. Despite this analysis
finding no support for an association between rates of exclusionary discipline and the number of
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threat assessments, this appears to be an anomaly among threat assessment research, but in actuality
it may be more complicated.
Numerous studies have shown that threat assessment is linked with lower rates of lower
rates of exclusionary discipline for students (Cornell et al., 2009; 2011; 2012; Cornell & Lovegrove,
2015; Maeng et al., 2020; Nekvasil & Cornell, 2015); however, the findings are not for threat
assessment at large, but for schools using a particular threat assessment model – one developed by
researchers from the University of Virginia. The Comprehensive School Threat Assessment
Guidelines, or CSTAG, (Cornell, 2018), formerly known as the Virginia School Threat Assessment
Guideline or the Virginia Model, differ from the guidelines created for and promoted by the
Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, mainly in the classification of threats by the
threat assessment team. As such, it is an important clarification to note within the threat assessment
literature, that the use of this particular model (CSTAG) is associated with lower rates of
exclusionary discipline, among other outcomes, and that these are not outcomes for threat
assessment at large. The CSTAG model was recognized as an evidence-based practice by the
National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP) of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services in 2013, marking an important advance in the threat assessment field.
However, more research is needed on the broad effects of threat assessment on discipline, not only
the effects of a certain model, as this analysis found no such support.
While threat assessment practitioners consistently view school safety in a holistic capacity
and view threat assessment as an enhancement to school safety (when it is implemented correctly),
threat assessment was not found to be associated with all aspects of school safety. Increases in
threat assessment were only found to be associated with one aspect of school safety - physical
security measures. Ultimately, this study found no support for the association of threat assessment
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and other school safety measures like school climate or exclusionary discipline. This was a
particularly interesting finding in light of so many practitioners defining school safety in a holistic
fashion, including both physical security and school climate. School administrators also consistently
thought of school safety in terms of preparedness and administrative policies and procedures, which
highlights the expansive view of school safety. What is perhaps more telling, and could possibly
provide insight to the siloed nature of this study’s findings that threat assessment is only associated
with physical security measures, was that in identifying threats to school safety practitioners often
cited threats to physical security—particularly school violence. Across all role types, external-tointernal threats were the most commonly identified type of threat; almost all examples of school
violence manifested inside the school. For example, participants shared stories of arguments or
feuds originating on social media and coming to a head violently at school, including gang violence,
bullying, or simple schoolyard fights. Accordingly, while practitioners see school safety as an
inclusive concept, many view threats to school safety only in the physical security paradigm,
potentially explaining the lack of statistically association between threat assessment and other
aspects of school safety. Consequently, it seems the association between threat assessment and
school safety mirror conditions in threat assessment implementation – consistently inconsistent.
Threat Assessment Team Dynamics
Despite identified concerns in the implementation and operations of threat assessment, this
study uncovered positive perceptions of threat assessment as well, particularly as it relates to the
threat assessment team and threat assessment efficacy. While this study confirmed that the use of
threat assessment is increasing among public middle and high schools in Virginia, it also exposed
positive views of the threat assessment in general and an overwhelmingly positive view of threat
assessment teams in schools.
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Examining perceptions of team dynamics by role type, this study found that unlike their
thoughts on threat assessment processes, school counselors overwhelmingly described threat
assessment team dynamics in a positive light as compared to other role types, like school
administrators and school resource officers. One school counselor claimed that “we have the
greatest team,” which was a common sentiment among school counselors as one reported that
“everyone has a common goal and the work is important,” with another counselor agreeing, “we’re
all on the same page and work well together.” School administrators were more diverse in their
views of team dynamics with some simply noting that “all members come to the table with info and
has the opportunity to be heard, their voices have value – it helps in sharing info so everyone
understands the context” while others lamented the challenges with information sharing among
members and infighting among administrators. Views on team dynamics were similarly split among
school resource officers, but again trended toward positive, with one noting “the team dynamic is
crucial because we all wear different hats and bring different expertise and feedback.”
Understanding these perceptions is essential to future threat assessment and school safety policy.
While practitioners had concerns and suggestions about the threat assessment process and
implementation fidelity, these positive perceptions demonstrate that practitioners from different role
types, with their differing biases, can work together successfully towards a common goal. One
wonders if the process of engaging multi-disciplinary team members to gather and examine
contextual information could be extended to other school-based processes, like alternatives to
suspension. Perhaps by uncovering more information about the conditions in which discipline or
criminal violations occur, instead of simply punishing the violator, services can be rendered to best
mitigate and address the underlying conditions of the offense, as is completed by the threat
assessment process.
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One additional interesting finding concerning views of team dynamics, although not entirely
surprising, was the pattern that emerge in regard to threat assessment activity levels. Specifically, all
negative views of threat assessment team dynamics clustered within the no activity groupings,
meaning that practitioners from schools that did not perform threat assessments were the only ones
to view team dynamics in a negative light. This could be due to a lack of training or lack of
resources, however, what is clear is that schools who are not actively engaging in the threat
assessment process are not experiencing the beneficial impacts of the process itself – building
positive, multidisciplinary relationships to mitigate threats to the school community.
Power Differentials
To better understand threat assessment team dynamics, this study also investigated power
differentials among threat assessment team members. While there was variation across school roles
in how practitioners viewed power distributions within threat assessment teams, it was clear through
analyzing the totality of the focus group transcripts that school administrators ultimately hold the
power in schools, especially concerning threat assessment teams. Consistently, practitioners detailed
how school administrators decided who served on the threat assessment team and how many
members the team would have. Additionally, school administration seemed to be the arbiter of the
involvement of school resource officers as several administrators and school resource officers
detailed the level of their involvement on the threat assessment team was dependent upon their
relationships with the school administrator. While several administrators believed their teams to be
harmonious, and ultimately came to a consensus on threat assessment decisions, it was clear the
administrators believed they ultimately had the final say in the decisions of the threat assessment
team. This finding underscores the tremendous power held by school administrators. By selecting
threat assessment team members, deciding which cases come to the threat assessment team, and
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being the final voice in the process, the school administrator can choose to have an active, fully
trained, multi-disciplinary threat assessment team, or an inactive, untrained, team of one or two that
assesses threats at the whim of the administrator. Understanding the power inherent in the role of
the school administrator underscores the need for appropriate training and resources at the schoollevel.
In addition to the concentrated power of the school administrator, this analysis also
uncovered that some power over threat assessment is vested at the division level. Several
practitioners noted that staff at the division-level dictates most threat assessment policy and
procedures, to include training schedules, resource allocation, and team composition. As one
participant noted, “Central Office are the real gatekeepers, any disagreements go to Central Office
and they can order a threat assessment to be redone if it is done incorrectly,” while another relayed
that at the school level they were merely fact finders and that staff at the division-level conducted
all of the threat assessments. This finding again highlights the broader theme of inconsistencies in
schools across the Commonwealth and mirrors results in the quantitative strand, where school
climate had the opposite association with school discipline. Specifically, at the division level,
decreased in rates of exclusionary discipline were associated with increases in school climate, but at
the school level decreases in discipline were associated with increases in school climate. The
unstandardized nature of schools and school divisions across the Commonwealth could explain
these differences, as some divisions exercise great control over the policies and procedures of their
schools while other divisions provide more autonomy to their schools. Threat assessment and other
school safety practices may be an area in which, from division to division, the level of oversight
changes and thus patterns are inconsistent. Future research should examine division level oversight
more closely to determine who truly holds the power.
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Threat Assessment Efficacy
To close out each focus group, participants were asked to whether they believed threat
assessment enhanced or affected school safety. Responses here were overwhelmingly positive.
Practitioners responded that using threat assessment “gets kids the services they haven’t had,
services they desperately need, it is incredibly helpful to catch kids that would have slipped through
the cracks” and that “it can alert more people to an issue and kids get more resources – it triggers a
system to fix things.” More broadly some saw threat assessment as a benefit as “it opens lines of
communication and acknowledges a threat and addresses it before it gets worse,” and that it is
“definitely effective – it makes us more aware and more confident” and “just having knowledge that
you dove in and offered assistance, analyzed the situation, and mitigated a threat – I don’t know
what we did in the past, but I couldn’t imagine doing this job without threat assessment, it gets
positive conclusions.” The glowing endorsements continued with one practitioner noting
“numerous cases are easy to deescalate the potential for violence because of interventions,
conversations, and engagement – it enhances school safety” and “school is definitely a safer place
for having it because there’s situations that have come through that we’ve been able to mitigate
because of the process – definitely worthwhile.”
Even though perspectives were substantially positive, some practitioners hedged their
positive impressions with real concerns, such as “big picture, it would be better if we had more
resources to be proactive rather than reactive – it is important and helpful though” and it is
“excellent if used properly – we skip over so much – we don’t even do it correctly.” These unique
findings again underscore the team of inconsistency as it pertains to threat assessment. While it
seems apparent that practitioners value threat assessment and view it as an enhancement to school
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safety, major concerns exist that even color their overall evaluation of threat assessment and its
effect on school safety.
Limitations
This analysis employed a concurrent, parallel mixed methods design in an attempt to
triangulate several sources of school level secondary data with focus groups of threat assessment
practitioners. The merging of each data source aimed to provide a holistic, detailed picture of the
threat assessment process and associations with school safety overtime. While this analysis
achieved this goal, and addressed several gaps in the literature, it was not without certain
limitations.
In the quantitative strand, this study was not an experimental design, and findings are merely
an examination of the association between the independent and dependent variables, and should not
be interpreted as causal (Johnson, 2001). However, by using a longitudinal assessment, conclusions
drawn were strengthened as longitudinal analyses can be more precise by eliminating
interindividual variability (Cook & Ware, 1983). Although the use of a longitudinal design provided
substantial benefit in the identification of patterns over time, by relying on secondary data, the
research was limited in data sources that were measured consistently over time. From year to year,
questions in certain data sources (the School Safety Audit Survey and School Climate Survey)
change. For example, in the most recent School Safety Audit Survey, principals were asked about
threat assessment team training, team composition, and records retention within their schools.
Utilizing this data in a cross-sectional analysis could expand more upon findings from the
qualitative portion. These data, however, were not consistently measured overtime and therefore
could not be considered for a longitudinal assessment.
Additionally, while existing models do include several covariates, there is always the
chance of missing confounding variables. For example, school or division funding may factor into
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how active a school’s threat assessment team might operate due to budgetary restrictions or
overstretched resources. If a measure of school funding was included, it would be possible to
examine the effect of funding on the various school safety outcomes. An additional variable that
would be helpful to consider would be a measure of crime within the community surrounding the
school. The addition of this variable could determine similarities or associations in threat
assessments, school climate, and school discipline as a condition of neighborhood crime. As was
discussed previously, practitioners identified inconsistencies in resources. Similarly, the lack of
standardization across schools and divisions may have contributed to the availability of alternatives
to suspension, or other school or division policies might affect the disciplinary outcomes or school
climate.
Lastly, as school safety has been a somewhat nebulous topic in the literature (Mayer &
Furlong, 1999), there were potential threats to internal validity. By using three different outcome
variables to represent school safety - a physical measure, a climate measure, and a disciplinary
measure, my hope was for this analysis to expand the definitions of school safety to be more than
simply a proxy for school violence (Mayer & Furlong, 2010). Also, using a count for threat
assessment and physical security could possibly have hindered the analysis. Perhaps using a rate per
student, per school may have elicited different results, as a rate would take into consideration the
total number of students within a school and standardize the measure. By changing the variable,
there could be a clearer relationship established, or not at all, between threat assessment and
physical security measures. Ultimately, the merging of these findings with findings from the
qualitative strand may strengthen the overall internal validity and be useful to contradict divergent
findings. Concerning external validity, this study was based on a subpopulation of Virginia schools,
and there remains a question regarding the generalizability of the findings. As Virginia was the first
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state to mandate threat assessment teams for K-12 schools, it remains a unique environment to
implement a growth model by having 5+ years of consistent data regarding threat assessment teams.
Although schools vary from state to state, findings from this analysis may inform future threat
assessment practices, especially when coupled with findings from the qualitative strand.
In qualitative, and subsequently mixed methods, analyses, the term validity remains
controversial as some scholars view the construct as a "debunked modernist perspective that
champions universal rationality, rules, order, logic, and the like" (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Collins,
2011, p. 55). In lieu of validity, this analysis characterizes threats to validity as legitimation - a
quality assurance measure that assesses the inferences made and methods used (Onwuegbuzie,
Johnson, & Collins, 2011). The first challenge to legitimation were procedural concerns through
researcher bias. As a former state employee, and advocate/instructor for threat assessment practices,
I recognize I may present biases acting as lead moderator, coder, and even in the question design
portion. To minimize the influence of these biases, I asked several committee members to review
my focus group questions. I was also cognizant of the issue of researcher bias in the analysis phase.
In the qualitative strand, I listened to and coded every focus group. This group-by-group
transcription provided an opportunity for memoing and bracketing – as a reflection activity and to
reduce any researcher biases (Benaquisto, 2008). This process also allowed for the familiarization
with the data prior to final coding. As a doctoral candidate, I routinely consulted with my chair and
invited their oversight in transcribing, coding, and analysis. Another challenge appeared within the
focus groups, as a moderator, I was often unable to drill down or circle back to certain topics due
the conversational flow within the focus groups itself. Perhaps interviews may have elicited a
greater depth on some of the topics. Lastly, the analysis of qualitative data was situated in a
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positivist, content analysis framework. Undertaking a post-positivist approach, analyzing focus
groups for themes and deeper meaning may uncover richer findings.
As this analysis employed a hybrid method of coding, additional legitimation concerns were
quelled by following the three-phase procedure outlined by Swain (2018) in an effort to provide a
trail of evidence to increase credible findings through a systematic process. Using both a priori and
posteriori coding allowed for a deeper search for meaning the two sets of codes are applied (Swain,
2018). Ultimately, by providing a unique perspective on threat assessment, this data was
complementary to findings from the quantitative strand.
Future Research
As previously highlighted, findings from this study address several gaps in the literature and
provide unique insight into the perspectives of several types of practitioners as it relates to school
safety and threat assessment. These findings are important and create a space and need for future
research.


Fidelity. One of the chief complaints from threat assessment practitioners was that their
schools were not implementing or conducting threat assessment in accordance with best
practices and model guidelines. A closer examination of threat assessment operations within
a school or school division (or all of them) is needed to better understand barriers to
implementation fidelity.



Needs Assessments. In line with the prior recommendation, practitioners identified several
crucial areas for improvement, chief among them being training and resources. A needs
assessment of all public schools in the Commonwealth could help clarify what is needed at
the school and division level, and where. Specifically, where and what resources could be
filtered based on identified needs across schools.

DISSERTATION PROPOSAL


124

School Safety Outcomes. Future research is also needed to expand and confirm prior
research on threat assessment, expanding research to investigate apparent differences in
outcomes based on the type of threat assessment model being used in schools. The present
study uncovered that several findings from prior threat assessment research (Cornell et al.,
2017; Cornell et al., 2018) could not be extended beyond one model of threat assessment.
There are several questions that emerge from this discordance – is the CSTAG model just
better or are there questions regarding implementation fidelity that delegitimate the prior
findings. Post-positivist analysis. The qualitative portion of this analysis operated within a
content analysis framework, focusing on a manifest, literal interpretation of the focus
groups. Future research should consider a post-positivist, latent, interpretive assessment of
the data, uncovering themes which might help better understand the perspectives of threat
assessment practitioners.



Threat assessment nationally. This assessment focused exclusively on public schools in
Virginia. Now that more states are implementing and mandating threat assessment in
schools, many of which require a reporting mandate (Smith & Cleary, in preparation), it
would be important to understand and compare the implementation of and experiences with
threat assessment in other states.

Policy Implications
The present study focused on the threat assessment process in the K-12 environment in
Virginia since the introduction of a threat assessment team mandate in 2013 and explored the
association between the use of threat assessment and school safety outcomes. This project was the
first to assess this association in tandem over time and the first to incorporate the views of K-12
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threat assessment practitioners. Mixing of methods here illuminated several areas in need of
attention regarding policy directives.


More and better training. While the number of threat assessments have increased,
practitioners identified numerous concerns regarding the implementation and utilization of
threat assessment. Particularly, threat assessment team members need more training and
more intensive team-based training in which the entire threat assessment team trains
together. Numerous practitioners cited this need as a chief concern. More training can also
address process complaints from threat assessment team members regarding issues such as
conducting threat assessments with all team members, completing the entire recommended
process, and committing to follow-up after the threat assessment.



More resources. Another chief concern among practitioners was the struggle with needed
resources. There seemed to be a great deal of variation and inconsistency across school
divisions. Practitioners consistently cited a lack of staff, chiefly school resource officers and
school counselors, which put pressure on exiting staff, potentially letting valid threats (and
students) fall through the cracks. Of course, increases in staffing comes with associated
financial costs. However, with an over $2 billion dollar school security industry (WoodrowCox & Rich, 2018) promoting advanced locks, bulletproof backpacks, and social media
monitoring that are being marketed to schools, perhaps those dollars could be better spent on
more personnel to cover the needs of students and schools. After-action reports from
instances of targeted violence in schools never seem to point to more locks, surveillance, or
gadgets as the recommendations for improvement, but instead focus on enhanced training,
and staff resources as solutions (Goodrum et al., 2018). Grant funding for localities to
implement threat assessment should also be considered. Funding allocations could also have
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the additional benefit of oversight from threat assessment experts at the state level,
ultimately ensuring fidelity to the threat assessment model.


Oversight. Given the consistent inconsistencies cited by not only threat assessment
practitioners, but also found in the quantitative data, implementation oversight could be
useful to maintain fidelity to the threat assessment model. While this may more easily
achieved through conditions placed upon grant funding, as refenced above, creating a
certification or monitoring process may be more beneficial to promote equity and
consistency across the Commonwealth. An oversight mechanism could mirror existing statelevel oversight, like in the Departments of Juvenile Justice or Criminal Justice Services. As
an example, regional law enforcement training academies are required to be certified and
recertified by the Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), who monitor,
investigate, and evaluate academies based on identified regulations and procedures 17. Threat
assessment programs in schools could undergo similar certification processes, whereas
evaluators at DCJS could ensure that threat assessment team members attend training and
are implementing the process with fidelity. This type of oversight could promote fidelity to
the threat assessment model, thereby promoting school safety and minimizing the risk of a
targeted violence incident in Virginia schools.

Conclusion
Threat assessment is a growing approach to school safety that is supported by threat
assessment practitioners, with caveats. Fidelity to the model is needed to ensure the goal of threat
assessment is being achieved – identifying, evaluating, classifying, and mitigating threats to the
school community to keep students and staff safe. The present study focused on the threat

17

See https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/law-enforcement/programs/field-services.
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assessment process in the K-12 environment in Virginia and is the first to examine the association
between threat assessment and school safety in tandem over time and the first to incorporate the
views of K-12 threat assessment practitioners. Findings from this study demonstrate that while the
number of threat assessments has increased across the study period (2013-2020), threat assessment
practitioners identified numerous concerns regarding threat assessment training, expressed doubts
about fidelity to the recommended process, and revealed an overall inconsistency in the
implementation of threat assessment and resource availability across the Commonwealth.
Additionally, threat assessment practitioners consistently viewed school safety in a holistic capacity
and consider threat assessment to be an enhancement to school safety (when it is implemented
correctly). Increases in threat assessment were not found to be statistically associated with all
aspects of school safety, as only physical security measures maintained a positive association with
increases in threat assessment, while there was no association between threat assessment and school
climate or exclusionary discipline. Ultimately, threat assessment proves to be a valuable tool to
enhance school safety, but further research is needed to understand this connection in more depth.
Supports and resources for schools and divisions across the Commonwealth are also needed to
ensure that threat assessment is implemented and practiced with fidelity, thereby helping to
minimize the risk of targeted violence in schools.
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Appendix A: Focus Group Guide
Focus Group Guide
Introductions

-

Moderator, Co-Moderator introductions

-

Overview of topic (threat assessment teams and school safety) and purpose of research

-

Overview of guidelines
-

Reminder to not use names of staff, students, schools, or administration.

-

Reminder that session will be recorded, but recordings will be destroyed once
transcriptions are completed.

School Safety

Threat
Assessment

Threat
Assessment
Teams

-

Request to record

-

Prompt to pre-Covid conditions

-

How would you define school safety?

-

In your opinion, what are the most important school safety concerns?

-

Please describe the climate of your school. How do students and staff describe their
experiences of safety at your school?

-

What does threat assessment mean to you, in your profession?

-

Please describe any training you received on threat assessment.

-

Please share your thoughts on the threat assessment process, as a whole?

-

Can you tell me about how threat assessment teams are formed in your school?
-

-

Prompt for elaboration - length of service, selection of members.

Describe the experience of training together with your team.
-

Prompt for elaboration - formal meetings, formal training.

-

Please share an experience when your team worked well together.

-

Please share an experience when your team didn't work well together.

-

How could the experience of working in a team improve?

-

Has your team ever disagreed about a case?

-

How is the final determination made?
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Could you explain how power is distributed within the team? How are disagreements
handled?

Threat
Assessment

School Safety

Conclusions

-

How does your division/school support threat assessment?

-

What changes would you recommend to the threat assessment process?

-

In what ways is threat assessment effective? Explain what effective means to you?

-

How do you think threat assessment enhances overall school safety? Explain.

-

Think back earlier to how you defined school safety – How is your school safer because of
your threat assessment team?

-

Confidentiality reminder

-

Contact information

-

Field any questions

-

Dismissal

